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THE NEED FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATION: 1830-1976
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE
PROMOTION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EXECUTION
OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE AGAINST
NATIVE AMERICANS
The opposite of love is not hate; it's indifference.
The opposite of art is not ugliness; it's indifference.
The opposite of faith is not heresy; it's indifference.
The opposite of life is not death; it's indifference.
Because of indifference, one dies before one actually dies.
Elie Wiesel. 1
INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 2000, the head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) formally apologized for the agency's participation in the "eth-
nic cleansing" 2 of Western tribes.3 From the forced relocation and as-
similation of the "sauvage" 4 to the white man's way of life to the
forced sterilization of Native Americans, the BIA set out to "destroy
all things Indian." 5 Through the exploration of the United States'
Federal Indian policy, it is evident that this policy intended to "de-
1. Lionel VonFrederick Rawlins, Indifference + Inaction = Genocide, in ANATOMY OF GENO-
CIDE: STATE-SPONSORED MAss-KILLINGS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 421 (Alexandre Kimenyi
& Otis L. Scott eds., 2001).
2. It should be noted that "ethnic cleansing," which refers to the intent to remove a group
from a specific location, is not considered a form of genocide. Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The
Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 Hou. J.
INT'L L. 467, 501 (2001).
3. Remarks of Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary- Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior,
at the Ceremony Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (September 8, 2000), available at http://www4.nau.edu/itep/gover-remarks.html
(last updated January 7, 2002).
4. Beginning as early as the 1600s, some Colonizers commonly referred to Native Americans
as "sauvages" because of the resistance they faced when attempting to take over Native Ameri-
can land. See BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERICAN 5-6 (1982). The Supreme Court in
Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh agreed with this proposition by stating, "[T]he tribes
of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war." Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823).
5. Gover, supra note 3.
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stroy, in whole or in part,"' 6 the Native American population.7 The
extreme disparity in the number of Native American people living
within the United States' borders at the time Columbus arrived, ap-
proximately ten million 8 compared to the approximate 2.4 million In-
dians and Eskimos alive in the United States today,9 is but one factor
that illustrates the success of the government's plan of "Manifest
Destiny."10
No longer can we remain indifferent and justify these acts of geno-
cide committed by the United States government, its agencies, and its
personnel against Native Americans as a result of colonization or the
need to establish a prosperous union. Instead, the United States gov-
ernment, its agencies, and those involved with carrying out the mea-
sures designed to inflict genocidal acts against the Native American
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 9, 1948, at art. II, 102 Stat. 3045, 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]. The mens rea required by the Genocide Convention includes the specific intent to
"destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Id. See also John
Webb, Genocide Treaty-Ethnic Cleansing, Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application
of the Genocide Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT'L &
COMI. L. 377, 388-90 (1993).
7. For further discussion on this topic, see infra notes 249-317 and accompanying text, where
the Genocide Convention is applied to the United States Federal Indian policy, thereby finding
that the practices carried out under the auspices of this policy clearly represent acts of genocide.
8. DIPPIE, supra note 4, at xvii. Henry F. Dobyns calculated the population of Native Ameri-
cans at the time of Columbus' arrival "by multiplying the lowest figure for any given Indian
population ... by a depopulation factor of 20 ... , representing the decrease due to disease and
other causes related to white advance" Id. This calculation is commonly refuted and a scholarly
debate continues regarding the true number of Native Americans living within, what is now
considered, the United States. See WARD CHURCHILL, A LI-n'LE MATI'ER OF GENOCIDE: HOLO-
CAUS'I ANt) DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT 131-37 (1997) (discussing the "sta-
tistical extermination" of Native Americans). Besides death, other tools used by the United
States government to decrease the Indian population were certain federal policies, such as the
Dawes Act of 1887, which purposely defined "Indian" as narrowly as possible to exclude even
full-blooded Indians from claiming their native status. See infra notes 173-182 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion on the Dawes Act of 1887. Interestingly, today Native Americans con-
tinue to be the only race that is required to prove their blood quantum in order to receive
federal assistance. Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native American Law and
Policy: Exorcising Aboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 325, 329-331 (1998).
9. This figure represents those who reported only a single race in the 2000 Census. U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census, Table DP-l. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, at http://
www.census.gov/census2000/States/us.html (last visited March 7, 2002).
10. WARD CHURCHILL, INDIANS ARE Us?: CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH
AMERICA 36-38 (1994). United States policy makers adopted the philosophy of "Manifest
Destiny," which embodied the taking of all Indian lands and the extermination of all Indians in
order to achieve expansion into the West. Id. This policy of "Manifest Destiny" also encom-
passed the government's plan to assimilate the Indian to the white man's way of life, which
included the adoption of United States citizenship, the English language, and Christianity. Rob-
ert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing
the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACK-
LI-IER L.J. 107, 108-09 (1999).
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population must be held in violation of customary international law,
as well as conventional international law,"1 as proscribed in the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention). 12
The term "genocide" was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 and
was derived from the Greek word genos, which means tribe or race,
and the Latin word cide, which is commonly found in words such as
homicide, infanticide, and fratricide. 13 In his first enunciation of "ge-
nocide," Lemkin defined the term in two different ways: (1) "the prac-
tice of extermination of nations and ethnic groups as carried out by
invaders" and (2) "[the] destruction of the national pattern of the op-
pressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the
oppressor.' 4 Currently, "genocide" is commonly defined as "acts
committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group.' 15
The crime of "genocide" is recognized as one of the most heinous
international crimes under customary international law.' 6 A practice
is proscribed as a crime under customary international law through
the existence of the following: (1) uniformity of state practice, (2) gen-
erality of state practice, and (3) the opinion that state practice is re-
quired by law.17 Customary international law also recognizes any
11. International customs and conventions are two of the four sources of international law as
defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(l), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, T.S.
No. 993. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A
Theoretical Framework, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d
ed. 1999).
12. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. III - IV.
13. JAMES J. MARTIN, THE MAN WHO INVENTED "GENOCIDE": THE PUBLIC CAREER AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPHAEL LEMKIN 137-38 (1984).
14. Id. at 138.
15. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. II. See also Frank Chalk, Redefining Genocide,
GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 47-49 (George J. Andrepoulos ed.,
1994) (discussing early definitions of the term "genocide").
16. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Preamble.
17. Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commission and the
Duty to Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 36-47 (1999). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-11 (5th ed. 1998).
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crime that is universally condemned by the international community
as a jus cogens international crime, 8 which gives rise to obligations
erga omnes. 9 In accordance with customary international law, an ob-
ligation erga omnes requires a state party to extradite or prosecute
perpetrators of these crimes found within its territory. 20 Because the
international community has universally condemned genocide, as evi-
denced in part by the ratification of the Genocide Convention, it has
risen to the level of a jus cogens international crime. As a result, any
individuals, agencies, or states that commit genocide must be held
accountable. 2'
On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly 22 ap-
proved a draft of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, and since then 135 states have ratified the
Convention,23 including the United States.24 According to the Vienna
18. "The term 'jus cogens' means 'the compelling law' and as such, a jus cogens norm holds
the highest hierarchical position among all other norms and principles." M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn
1996, at 67.
19. Erga omnes means "flowing to all," and because all jus cogens international crimes require
an obligation "flowing to all," obligatio erga omnes is a consequence of a crime being recognized
as jus cogens. Id. at 72-73.
20. Id.
21. Various scholars agree that genocide is a crime under customary international law, which
has risen to the level of a jus cogens international crime, from which there is no derogation.
Remarks by Jordan Paust, Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State Responsibility,
83 AM. Soc'y INT'L PROC. 314, 316-21 (1989). See infra notes 36-87 and accompanying text for
further discussion on the crime of genocide as proscribed under customary international law.
22. Article 7 of the United Nations Charter established the General Assembly as one of the
principal organs of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 7. The General Assembly is be-
stowed with the following duties, pursuant to Article 13 of the United Nations Charter:
The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the pur-
pose of:
a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification;
b. promoting international co-operation in the ecomonic, social, cultural, educational,
and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
Id. The General Assembly has interpreted these duties to include the passage of resolutions
addressing matters of international concern; the Genocide Convention was a resolution adopted
by the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg. at 174, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
23. Those 135 states are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Ku-
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Convention on the Laws of Treaties, conventions are binding and en-
forceable against all states that have signed and ratified the specific
convention.25 Therefore, in accordance to Article IV of the Genocide
Convention, which requires all parties to prosecute those charged with
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement
to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in
genocide, regardless of their capacity as a ruler or public official, 26 in a
wait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mexico,
Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation,
Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic,
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United
States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and
Zimbabwe. United Nations Treaty Documentation Center, at http//untreaty.un.org:80/EN-
GLISH/ (last visited February, 2001). See generally LAWERENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION (1991).
24. The United States ratified the Genocide Convention on November 25, 1988 with the fol-
lowing reservations:
(1) That with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which
the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United States is required
in each case.
(2) That nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by
the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as
interpreted by the United States.
102 Stat. 3045, 3045 (1988). See also infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text for a discussion
on the reasons the United States signed the Convention nearly forty years after its creation, and
with such limiting reservations.
25. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 26.
26. Article IV of the Genocide Convention states, "Persons committing genocide or any of
the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally re-
sponsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at
art. IV. The international community's recent refusal to uphold the granting of immunity to
rulers or public officials who commit heinous international crimes can be evidenced in the Stat-
utes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda as well as
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Statute of the Internatonal Crimi-
nal Court Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, at art. 7, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th Mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, at art. 6, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994). On the issue of immunity, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
states as follows:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government
official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute,
nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at art. 27(1), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998),
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Both Article 7 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
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competent tribunal within the State where the crime took place or in a
competent international tribunal that has proper jurisdiction over the
case,2 7 any persons or agencies that commit acts of genocide within
the territory of the United States must be held accountable for their
crimes. 28
Even though the crime of genocide remains universally condemned
by the international community, the United States government, its
agencies, and its personnel have been effectively granted de facto im-
munity.29 The time has come to hold the perpetrators of these acts of
genocide accountable and to formulate a system of reparation for the
victims of these heinous international crimes, in order for the world,
as well as the victims, to realize that justice does prevail in the interna-
tional community.
This Comment will address the demise of Native Americans' liveli-
hood, reproductive rights, and identity at the hands of the United
States government, its agencies, and its personnel. Because the
United States had a direct role in perpetrating genocidal acts against
Native Americans, it must be held accountable for these acts. The
international community must hold these agencies and persons re-
sponsible, and an apology and reparations must be awarded to Native
slavia and Article 6 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda mirror the language used
in the Rome Statute of the ICC.
27. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. IV. The Genocide Convention, therefore, has
specific jurisdictional limitations. See infra notes 99-116 for a discussion on the jurisdictional
limitations imposed by the United States in the Genocide Convention Implementing Act of
1988.
28. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties came into force on January 27, 1980, thirty
days after the thirty-fifth state deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339. The United States signed the Vienna Convention on April 24, 1970, but it has
not yet ratified it. Although the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention, it is
now considered part of customary international law. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214
F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that "[t]he United States recognizes the Vienna Convention
as a codification of customary international law"); Doe I. v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (referring to the Vienna Convention for the definition of a jus cogens norm).
29. Throughout history, perpetrators of jus cogens international crimes were perceived to be
above the law, and justice was commonly traded for impunity; however, to much of the interna-
tional community's surprise, recent events, such as the Chilean Supreme Court's order requiring
the re-arrest of General Augusto Pinochet on charges of kidnapping and murder committed
during his seventeen-year rule, as well as the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic for crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, have proved otherwise. See Alfredo S. Lanier,
Chile Judge Orders Pinochet Under House Arrest For Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2001, § 1, at 4; Ian
Fisher, Power Drove Milosevic to Crime, Prosecutors Say as Trial Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2002, § A, at 1. For a discussion on the need to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions
regardless of their public official status, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achiev-
ing Justice: The Need For Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROus., Autumn 1996, at 9-28.
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Americans for their grave losses. While the need for reparations is
clear, the method used to provide these reparations remains at issue.
Part II of this Comment will explore the evolution of the crime of
genocide as proscribed under both customary and conventional inter-
national law. 30 Part II will also address how international law is ap-
plied in the United States, specifically the Convention on the
Prevention and Prohibition of Genocide and customary international
law.31 Part III will explore the demise of Native Americans at the
hands of the United States.32 Part IV will analyze how the United
States government, its agencies, and its personnel committed acts of
genocide against Native Americans. 33 Part V will explore the implica-
tions of these acts of genocide on Native Americans today and the
appropriate method of reparation. 34 In conclusion, Part VI will ad-
dress the role of truth and justice in aiding the victims' healing
process.35
II. BACKGROUND: THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
A. The International Crime of Genocide as Proscribed Under
Customary International Law
International conventions, international customs, general principles
of law, and scholarly writings represent the four primary sources of
international law.36 These sources proscribe acceptable and unaccept-
able state practices, thereby defining crimes of international law and,
commonly, the appropriate mechanisms for accountability.
Historically, a customary international law was established through
the existence of "(1) uniformity of state practice, (2) generality of
state practice, and (3) the sense that state practice is required by law,
referred to as opinio juris necessitatis."37 The International Court of
Justice in The North Sea Continental Shelf Case38 found that "state
practice ... should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in
the sense of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have oc-
30. See infra notes 36-98 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 126-248 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 249-310 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 311-348 and accompanying text
35. See infra note 349 and accompanying text.
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 11.
37. Schabacker, supra note 17, at 36. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 4-11.
38. 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20).
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curred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of
law or legal obligation is involved. '39 Therefore, complete uniformity
and universality of state practice are not necessarily required, but
proof of such practice as obligator may be.40 Moreover, it has been
suggested that international crimes rise to the level of jus cogens only
in the following situations:
(1) [they] are deemed part of customary international law; (2) [there
is] language in preambles or other provisions of treaties applicable
to these crimes which indicates these crimes' higher status in inter-
national law; (3) [a] large number of states [ ] have ratified treaties
related to these crimes; and (4) [there are] ad hoc international in-
vestigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes.41
As early as the sixteenth century, the existence of international cus-
tomary law can be evidenced in the writings of Grotius,42 who de-
clared that certain acts, based on the nature of the act alone and
committed against an individual, violated the "law of nature or na-
tions. ' '43 Scholars of international law speculate that the act of piracy
on the high seas was the first crime recognized as an act in violation of
the law of nations.44 The violent nature of piracy and its correspond-
ing effects on commerce resulted in its universal condemnation by all
states; therefore, states were not required to establish jurisdiction over
the act or the perpetrator, rather the nature of the act itself granted
any state jurisdiction over the crime of piracy.45 As a result, prosecu-
tions for the crime of piracy occurred in state courts.46 Accordingly,
piracy came to be recognized as a crime under customary interna-
39. Id. at 43.
40. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 4-8 (noting that the International Court of Justice sometimes
assumes the existence of opinion juris and does, therefore, not require any proof).
41. Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 68.
42. Huoo GRO-tus, DE JURE BELLI AC PAcIS LIBRI TRES, bk II, ch. XXI, secs. III and IV,
526-29 (F. Kelsey trans., 1925).
43. Id. at 504.
44. See Lee A. Steven, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the United States
Is in Breach of its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425, 434 (1999).
45. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 235-37.
46. Id. at 235. See also United States v. Holmes, 18 US. 683, 686 (1820). This case states:
[Miurder or robbery committed on the high seas, may be an offence cognizable by the
courts of the United States, although it was committed on board of a vessel not belong-
ing to citizens of the United States, [ ] if she had no national character, but was pos-
sessed and held by pirates, or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign
nation.
1d. Therefore, as long as the ship was not flying a flag of a state, and pirates took the ship, the
United States could claim jurisdiction over the crime and prosecute the perpetrators in its judi-
cial system.
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tional law.47  Through the continued universal condemnation of
piracy, and the establishment of both the Convention on the High
Seas 48 and the Convention on the Laws of the Sea,4 9 the crime of
piracy rose to the level of a jus cogens international crime, which car-
ried with it obligatio erga omnes, the requirement to extradite or pros-
ecute perpetrators of these crimes. 50
In addition to piracy, slavery, slave-related practices, apartheid,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression, torture, and geno-
cide are recognized as jus cogens international crimes. 51 In fact, the
evolution of the prohibition of the crime of genocide under customary
international law and its rise to the level of a jus cogens international
crime 52 is analogous to the crime of piracy. A similar historical per-
spective of the crime of genocide proves that there exists a uniformity
of state practice condemning genocide, which correspondingly re-
quires the prosecution of the perpetrators of such a crime.
The Peace of Westphalia, which brought an end to the Thirty Years'
War in 1648, represents the beginning of the international commu-
nity's denouncement of the persecution of persons because of their
ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion.53 Similar protection for per-
sons from such crimes can be found in the Martens Clause of the 1907
Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land. 54 The Martens Clause stated, "[T]he inhabitants and the bel-
ligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of
the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience. '55 Following World War I, the Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penal-
47. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 236 (noting that the definition of the crime of piracy as found
in Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas represents the definition of piracy recognized
under customary international law).
48. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signatures Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, entered into force Sept. 30, 1962. The United States ratified the Convention on
April 12, 1961.
49. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [Montego Bay Convention], opened for
signature, December 10, 1982, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 21 I.L.M. 1261, entered into force November 16,
1994.
50. Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 65-68.
51. Id. at 68.
52. For a definition of a jus cogens international crime, see supra note 18.
53. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 20 (1948). The
Peace of Westphalia rejected the past persecution of persons based on their religion. Id.
54. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Preamble,
36 Stat. 2277, 2279-80 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
55. Id. (emphasis added).
920 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:911
ties for Violation of the Laws and Customs of War 56 intended to use
the Martens Clause as grounds to prosecute the "Young Turk" gov-
ernment for the Armenian genocide 57 on the basis that the massacre
and deportation of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire and the re-
sulting deaths were all premised on the plan to create a homogenous
state and constituted "crimes against the laws of humanity. '58 It has
been estimated that anywhere from 600,000 to 2,000,000 Armenians
died as a result of the Turks' actions.5 9
Once again, in response to the atrocities committed against individ-
uals because of their ethnicity, nationality, race, or religion, the inter-
national community created the London Charter in 194560 in order to
prosecute the leaders of the Nazi regime.61 Most importantly, the
Charter defined "Crimes Against Humanity" as "murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, . . or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
. . . .62 "Crimes Against Humanity," unlike genocide, must take place
during an armed conflict in order to constitute prosecutable acts. 63
The crime of genocide clearly evolved from states' universal con-
demnation of the persecution of persons based solely on their minor-
ity status, as seen through the establishment of the Hague
56. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need For a Specialized Convention,
31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 458 (1994).
57. It is interesting to note that various countries, including the United States, as well as inter-
national scholars refuse to recognize the existence of the "Armenian Genocide." Israel W.
Charny, Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide, in GENOCIDE: CONCErrUAL AND HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS 73-74 (George J. Andreopoulos ed., 1994); CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 30, 34.
58. Richard G. Hovannisian, Etiology and Sequelae of the Armenian Genocide, in GENOCIDE:
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS 123-125 (George J. Andreopolous ed., 1994); WIL-
LIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-23 (2000).
59. Hovannisian, supra note 58, at 125.
60. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter London Charter]. The London Charter established
"the jurisdiction, substantive law, and procedural principles governing the Nuremberg Tribunal."
STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERO LEGACY 188 (2d ed. 2001).
61. M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Estab-
lish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 23-29 (1997).
62. See London Charter, supra note 60, at art. 6(c). Note that Crimes Against Humanity were
officially codified into international law through the United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tion of December 11, 1946. G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946).
63. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian Law:
Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 617, 622-23 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d. ed. 1999).
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Convention 64 and the London Charter. 65 Even though these treaties
never explicitly proscribed the crime of genocide, it was condemned
within the definition of "Crimes Against Humanity."
The Preamble to the Genocide Convention acknowledged the long
existence of the crime of genocide by stating that "at all periods of
history[,] genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity. '66 Simi-
larly, in 1951, the International Court of Justice in the Reservations to
the Convention on the Protection and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide case, 67 recognized genocide's status under customary interna-
tional law when it stated that "the principles underlying the
Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as
binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. '68
Through the continuous state practice of prosecuting perpetrators of
genocide, such as the prosecutions at the International Military Tribu-
nal, the International Criminal Tribunal at Rwanda,69 and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 70 and the
universal condemnation of acts of genocide, 71 which appears in vari-
ous treaties, the crime of genocide has come to be proscribed under
customary international law.72
64. Hague Convention, supra note 54, at 2279-80 (using the laws of nations to define the
dictates of a just war).
65. London Charter, supra note 60, at art. 63(c), which explicitly criminalizes "persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime."
66. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Preamble.
67. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, 1951 I.C.J. 14 (May 28, 1951) [hereinafter Reservations case]. The Reservations case ex-
plored the legal limitations on the reservations made by member states to the Genocide
Convention, and found that a state that has made a reservation, which was thereby objected
upon, will remain a party as long as the reservation is within the object and purpose of the
Convention. id. The International Court of Justice found that the Convention's object and pur-
pose was to encourage universal ratification, and, therefore, to eliminate a state as a party to the
Convention based on its reservation would be contrary to the Convention's object and purpose.
Id. at 24. However, any state party that objects to the reservation may consider the reserving
state as not a party to the Convention. Id. at 29.
68. Id. at 23.
69. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sept. 2, 1998, at http://www.ictr.org
(last visited Mar. 6, 2002), for an example of the first conviction for the crime of genocide at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Id.
70. See Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Aug. 2, 2001, at http://www.un.org/
icty/krstic/TrialCl/judgement/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002). On August 2, 2001, Trial
Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the case of Pros-
ecutor v. Radislav Krstic, found former Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krstic,
guilty of genocide, persecutions, and murder. Id.
71. In the Reservations case, the International Court of Justice noted the "universal character
[ of the condemnation of genocide." Reservations, 1951 I.C.J. at 23.
72. Id.
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Through the recognition of genocide as part of customary interna-
tional law, the adoption of treaties, 73 the adoption of the Genocide
Convention, and the implementation of the ad hoc tribunals74 to pros-
ecute perpetrators of genocide, it is evident that the crime of genocide
has risen to the level of a jus cogens international crime. 75 As a result,
all states have an obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of
the crime of genocide.76
It should be noted that some scholars argue that the official pro-
scription of "genocide" as an international crime did not come about
until the adoption of the Genocide Convention, or in the alternative,
as early as the end of the Second World War; therefore, acts commit-
ted prior to this time could not have been international crimes. 77 The
Trial Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda
stated, however, "[The] holocaust of the Jews ... [was] very much
constitutive of genocide, but could not be defined as such because the
crime of genocide was not defined until later. ' 78 The statement above
demonstrates that the crime of genocide, as we know it today, was
proscribed and punished much earlier than the creation of the Geno-
cide Convention, but in the form of "Crimes Against Humanity" and
"war crimes."
73. The London Charter and the Hague Convention are examples of treaties that proscribe
crimes similar to genocide.
74. Following the genocides in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
were established, respectively, to prosecute the perpetrators of the genocide. See Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). See also PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT To-
MORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 242-55 (1998).
Gourevitch, reflecting on the atrocities committed within the Republic of Rwanda, noted:
Decimination means the killing of every tenth person in a population, and in the spring
and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres decimated the Republic of Rwanda.
Although the killing was low-tech-performed largely by machete-it was carried out at
dazzling speed: ... [Ait least eight hundred thousand people were killed in just a hun-
dred days. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.
/d. at 3. Regardless of the severe need for prosecution in these areas, both tribunals have been
criticized for their lack of effectiveness. In fact, between 1994 and January 2000, only 3,700 out
of more than 125,000 prisoners had been prosecuted in Rwanda. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment,
Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1287 (2000).
75. See supra notes 41-50 discussing the requisite elements necessary in order for a crime to
rise to the level of a jus cogens international crime.
76. Flowing from jus cogens international crimes is the obligation to prosecute or extradite
perpetrators of such crimes. See Bassiouni, supra note 18, at 65.
77. Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 2008-09
(2001).
78. Lippman, supra note 2, at 508.
2002] NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATION 923
B. Customary International Law as Applied in the United States
Perpetrators of the crime of genocide, when committed within the
United States or by United States' citizens, can be prosecuted under
customary international law, which proscribes the crime of genocide
as a jus cogens international crime.7 9 In 1900, the United States Su-
preme Court, in the Paquete Habana80  case, stated that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice. . . . For this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations."81 By relying on the "customs and usages of civilized
nations" and by declaring that "international law is part of our law,"
the Paquete Habana decision laid the groundwork for the role of cus-
tomary international law in the United States judicial system.8 2 In
fact, at least one scholar has declared that "customary international
law has now been characterized as 'federal common law." 83
Other cases, such as Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 have supported the
Supreme Court's reliance on customary international law when there
is no treaty or controlling law. However, the Filartiga decision ex-
panded the United States' responsibilities under international law by
holding that the United States, as a party to the United Nations Char-
ter,8 5 is required to uphold the "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tions as to race, sex, language or religion. '8 6 The court in Filartiga,
relying on customary international law, further held that torture is
clearly prohibited under the law of nations.8 7 As evidenced by the
Filartiga decision, the United States judiciary has come to accept in-
ternational law as part of its law; therefore, it is bound to interpret,
create, and apply customary and conventional international law when
applicable.
79. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the formation of customary
international law and jus cogens international crimes.
80. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1561-
67 (1984).
84. 630 F.2d. 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
85. The United States of America is one of 185 states party to the United Nations Charter,
which entered into force on October 24, 1945. INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-
27 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1999).
86. Filartiga, 630 F.2d. at 881.
87. Id. at 890.
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C. The Crime of Genocide as Proscribed Under the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
In response to the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany,88 the in-
ternational community adopted the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) in
hopes of prohibiting such atrocities from occurring again.8 9 As previ-
ously noted, the Genocide Convention is binding upon any state that
signs and ratifies the Convention.90 The definition of genocide, as laid
out in the Convention, includes the following crimes: (1) killing mem-
bers of the group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of the group; (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction "in whole or in
part"; (4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and (5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group. 91 Similarly, the Convention proscribes the
following acts as punishable: genocide, as enumerated under Article
II; conspiracy to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; and
complicity to commit genocide. 92
The Genocide Convention requires proof of the "intent to destroy a
group, in whole or in part," 93 which has been interpreted not to re-
quire the extermination of an entire group to fulfill the proof require-
ment.94 Interestingly, the text of the Genocide Convention excludes
from its proscription genocide based on an individual's culture or po-
litical views. 95 Such exclusions have been criticized for limiting the
application of the Convention, and thereby failing to protect certain
persons, such as in the case of the genocide in Cambodia.96 In fact,
"cultural genocide" was excluded from the Convention because some
88. Following the extermination of over six million Jewish persons and five million others
from varying ethnic groups, such as the Gypsies, the Nuremberg Trials were convened to prose-
cute the military personnel of the Third Reich responsible for these gross violations of human
rights. See CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 19 (exploring the legacy of Holocaust denial and other
genocides that are not widely known).
89. In 1958, a survivor of the Holocaust adopted a view of "never again"; however, in the last
twenty years we have seen more conflicts than ever before. GOUREVICH, supra note 74.
90. See supra notes 25-28 (discussing the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties and the
binding nature of Conventions that have been signed and ratified).
91. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. 11.
92. Id. at art. Ill.
93. Id. at art. 11.
94. Matthew Lippman, in Genocide, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 589, 597 (M.
Cherif. Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
95. WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179-89 (2000).
96. Id.
[Vol. 51:911
2002] NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATION 925
feared that it might be interpreted as condemning the assimilation of
minority groups, thereby discouraging certain member states from rat-
ifying the Genocide Convention. 97
The Genocide Convention, however, protects against the destruc-
tion of any group based on their nationality, ethnicity, race, and relig-
ious affiliation and requires member-states to punish perpetrators of
the crime of genocide accordingly. An example of a case in which the
Convention would apply is the forced sterilization of Native American
men and women, which occurred at the hands of the United States
government, its agencies, and its personnel;98 any person who imple-
mented sterilization programs, carried out the actual sterilization, or
knew of the sterilization program could be punished in the United
States.
D. The Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide
as Applied in the United States
In 1998, thirty-eight years after the approval of the Convention on
the Punishment and Prevention of Genocide (Genocide Convention),
the United States ratified the Convention. 99 The United States was
reluctant to sign and ratify the Genocide Convention for two reasons:
(1) the Convention was viewed as a pbssible invasion of state sover-
eignty 00 and (2) the existence of congressional concern surrounding
certain federal discriminatory legislation and policies that might be
seen as promoting and executing genocide. 101 Because the language
of the Convention allowed for the prosecution of acts committed with
the intent to destroy the group "in part," various members of Con-
gress were concerned that the implementors of the "Jim Crow"
laws,102 the official toleration of the Ku Klux Klan, the forced sterili-
zation programs,10 3 and the forced transfer of Native American chil-
97. Id. at 599.
98. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the United States
forced sterilization of Native Americans.
99. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 2-4.
100. Article VI of the United States Constitution states that treaties are the "supreme law of
the land." U.S. CONsr. art. VI. Because of this constitutional clause, many opponents to the
Convention feared that it would automatically trump preexisting domestic laws. LEBLANC,
supra note 23, at 128-34. However, various scholars argue that the Genocide Convention is a
non-self-executing treaty, which requires an act of Congress to implement the obligations into
the domestic legal system, as opposed to a self-executing treaty, which automatically enters into
effect after ratification. Id. at 134-35.
101. CHURCHILL, supra note 10, at 16-17; LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 129-130.
102. See Bunn v. Atlanta, 19 S.E.2d 553, 556-57 (Ga. App. 1942).
103. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
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dren to boarding schools 10 4 would be perceived as having had the
intent to destroy these groups "in part."' 5 During the 1950 Congres-
sional hearings, American Bar Association representative Schweppe
and subcommittee chair Connecticut Senator Brien McMahon, stated
the following:
SCHWEPPE: The point is that the intent does not need to exist to
destroy the whole group.
MCMAHON: Part of the group .... Now let's take lynching for
example, let's assume that there is a lynching and a colored man is
murdered .... Is it your contention that that could be construed as
being within the confines of the definition ....
SCHWEPPE: It is part of a racial group, and if it is a group of 5, a
group of 10, a group of 15, and I proceed after them with guns in
some community solely because they belong to some racial group
that the dictators don't like, I think you have got a serious question,
That's what bothers me.106
Consequently, the United States required, as a prerequisite to the rati-
fication of the Genocide Convention, that the instrument of ratifica-
tion not be deposited with the Secretary General of the United
Nations until Congress enacted implementing legislation.'0 7 On No-
vember 25, 1988, the United States deposited its ratification with res-
ervations that mandated that nothing within the text of the Genocide
Convention could require or authorize legislation or action by the
United States that contradicted the principles espoused in the United
States Constitution.10 8 Various countries objected to these reserva-
tions by arguing that, in effect, they nullified the Convention by al-
lowing the United States to use its Constitution to trump the authority
of the Convention. 0 9 Parties to the Genocide Convention argued
that the United States' reservations were not made in good faith be-
cause they allowed the United States to derogate from the Conven-
tion if its domestic law contradicted the requirements of the
Convention; therefore, the United States' reservations were seen to be
in conflict with Article 26 and Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on
104. See infra notes 221-248 and accompanying text.
105. Between the years of 1882-1930, it has been reported that at least 2,505 black men and
women in the ten southern states were subjected to lynchings, but when the remaining states are
included the number practically doubled. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 374-76.
106. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 374 (emphasis added).
107. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 142-143 (noting that this prerequisite was made to ensure
that the Genocide Convention was not self executing).
108. See supra note 24 for the explicit text of the reservations submitted by the United States
for the Genocide Convention.
109. SCHABAS, supra note 95, at 348-49.
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the Laws of Treaties. 110 However, the United States did not rescind
its reservations, and the Genocide Convention was ratified and imple-
mented into United States law subject to the reservations."1
Two years after the ratification of the Genocide Convention, Con-
gress implemented legislation entitled the Genocide Convention Im-
plementing Act of 1988 (Proxmire Act). 1 2 According to the
Proxmire Act, the United States would prosecute a perpetrator of the
crime of genocide either when the offense was committed within the
United States or when the alleged offender was a national of the
United States. 1 3 As a result of the limitations in the Proxmire Act,
the Genocide Convention cannot be used as a tool to prosecute acts of
genocide committed outside of the United States.' 14 However, the
acts committed against Native Americans, such as the forced reloca-
tion, sterilization, and the transfer of children into boarding schools,
took place within the United States, and the perpetrators of these acts
were United States citizens.1 15 Moreover, because there does not ex-
ist a statute of limitations for the crime of genocide, United States
citizens can be prosecuted for these crimes at any time.'" 6 Therefore,
the Genocide Convention, as tailored by the United States in the
Proxmire Act, can still be used as a basis to prosecute the perpetrators
of the crime of genocide within the United States' borders, regardless
of when the crimes were committed.1 17
Article IV of the Convention mandates prosecution regardless of
the status of the perpetrator by stating that any person who commits
genocide or acts in furtherance of genocide, regardless of their status,
110. The following countries objected to the United States' reservations: Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. United Nations Treaty Documentation Center, supra note 23. These objec-
tions were based on the fact that the United States reservations contradicted Article 26 and
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention of the Laws of Treaties, which requires treaties to be per-
formed in good faith. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, supra note 28, at art. 26.
Good faith has been interpreted to mean that a country cannot ratify a Convention and then
attach reservations allowing the country to derogate from the responsibilities of the Convention
because of domestic laws or policies.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1994).
112. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 144-45.
113. Proceeding, Eighty-Third Annual Meeting The American Society of International Law:
Genocide: The Convention, Domestic Laws, and State Responsibility, comments by Steven
Lubet (1989).
114. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 146.
115. See infra notes 139-248 and accompanying text.
116. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 150.
117. According to the Proxmire Act, the penalty for crimes resulting in the death of members
of a protected group is mandatory life imprisonment and a fine of not more than one million
dollars. However, in any other case, the penalty is imprisonment of not more than twenty years
and a fine of not more than one million dollars, or both. LEBLANC, supra note 23, at 149-50.
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as a constitutionally responsible ruler or a public official, must be held
accountable.' 18 This provision was included in the Convention to pre-
vent heads of state and other government officials from claiming im-
munity from prosecution for the crime of genocide.1 19
Even though genocide is condemned under customary international
law and through the Genocide Convention, few perpetrators of the
crime of genocide have been prosecuted for their actions. As a result,
the trials at Nuremberg remain one of the most successful tribunals
used to prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed against minorities
solely because of their religion, ethnicity, or nationality. Interestingly,
since then, the world has witnessed some of the most gruesome geno-
cides, which include the genocides in Rwanda,120 Yugoslavia, 21 and
Cambodia. 122 These genocides, along with the Armenian genocide, 123
the sterilizations performed by Nazi Doctors during the Holocaust, 124
and the forced assimilation of the indigenous in Australia, 125 illustrate
the continued existence of genocide and the need for the condemna-
tion of genocide. Most importantly, these instances serve to highlight
the genocidal nature of the acts committed by the United States
against Native Americans.
118. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Article IV.
119. See supra note 26.
120. It is reported that from 10,000 to 100,000 Hutus were killed in the Genocide in Rwanda.
Drumbl, supra note 74, at 1222, n.1. "Notwithstanding the low-tech nature of the massacres
[most of the murders were committed with machetes, sticks, tools, and large clubs studded with
nails], the dead of Rwanda accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the
Holocaust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki." Id. at 1246.
121. It has been estimated that between the years of 1945-1947, 82,000 persons were victim-
ized based on their ethnicity and nationality, while between the years of 1944-1987 the number
increased to 1,072,000 persons who were victimized for either indiscriminate or political reasons.
Jennifer Baliut, An Empirical Study of Conflict, Conflict Victimization and Legal Redress 1945-
1996, in 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 101, 118 (1998).
122. Between the years of 1975-1979, approximately 1,800,000 persons were victimized under
the Pol Pot regime. Id. at 116; see also Craig Etcheson, The Persistence of Impunity in Cambodia,
in 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 231 (1998).
123. See infra notes 249-276 and accompanying text, where the resettlement policy used by the
Turks to remove the Armenians is analogized to the forced relocation of Native Americans.
124. See infra notes 277-297 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the similarities be-
tween the Nazi doctors' use of sterilization procedures in the Holocaust and the United States
government's use of sterilization procedures from the 1930s until the late 1970s.
125. See infra notes 298-310 and the accompanying text for a discussion of commonalities
between Australia's treatment of the indigenous and the United States' treatment of Indians.
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III. THE DEMISE OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN POPULATION AT THE
HANDS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, ITS
AGENCIES, AND ITS PERSONNEL.
The definition of the crime of genocide and the United States' inter-
pretation and proscription of the crime, as discussed above, will be
helpful in explicitly highlighting the acts of genocide, such as the
forced relocation, sterilization, and assimilation of Native American,
committed by the United States government, its agencies, and its
personnel.
A. History of Broken Promises
When told ... no alternative remained to them [Native Americans]
as a nation but death or removal, they seemed not to hesitate say-
ing, "It is death anyhow. We may as well die here .... " They cling
to the graves of their fathers and say, "Let us die with them.., if we
leave this country, these hills and vales, this mountain air we shall
sicken and die.' 2 6
After the Revolutionary War, which ended on October 19, 1781, the
United States government was left with what was termed as the "In-
dian Problem," which its predecessors had failed to extinguish after
years of fighting and millions of deaths. 27 The "Indian Problem"
dealt largely with the Native American occupation of land that was
very attractive to settlers, as well as the uncivilized nature of Native
Americans, which in the settlers' opinion threatened their way of
life.128 The government concluded that the best solution to the "In-
dian Problem" was the forced removal of all Native American nations
from the East to the West; as a result, Native Americans were forced
from their sacred land, their most valued possession, to foreign
lands.129
Native Americans claimed their right to the land based on their
long occupation, as well as the preexisting treaties that granted them
126. DIPPIE, supra note 4 (quoting from a letter written by Sophia Sawyer, New Echota,
Georgia, 1832).
127. See CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 159-63, 168-75 for a list of the "Indian Wars" that took
place in North America.
128. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. William McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823), where the
Supreme Court stated that "to leave them [Indians] in possession of their country, was to leave
the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were
as brave and as high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt
on their independence." Id. This savage depiction of Native Americans inspired United States'
officials to force them to the West in order for the white settlers to "be safe."
129. Porter, supra note 10, at 108. For a discussion on Indian land rights, see Lawerence B.
Landman, International Protection for American Indian Land Rights? 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 59
(1987).
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specific rights to the land. 30 They further relied on Article VI of the
United States Constitution, which states that "once [treaties are] rati-
fied" they are the "supreme law of the land." 131 Therefore, Native
Americans argued that because treaties are the supreme law of the
land, the United States could not deviate from this standard by refus-
ing to recognize past treaties granting them specific rights to the
land. 132 Native Americans also referred to the Northwest Ordi-
nance 133 in support of their rights to the land. 134 On July 13, 1787,
Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, which stated, "[L]and and
property shall never be taken from [Native Americans] without their
consent[,] and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by
Congress." 135 Contrary to this established law, the United States gov-
ernment claimed that as "discoverers," their rights superceded that of
the Native Americans.136  Accordingly, the United States began
130. See HELEN HUNT JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR 9-21 (1995).
131. U.S. CONSI. art. VI.
132. JACKSON, supra note 130, at 9-21.
133. Northwest Ordinance, I Stat. 50 (1787).
134. JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES 119-20 (1996) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall
relied on the Northwest Ordinance in Worcester v. Georgia to support Cherokee claims to
sovereignty).
135. Northwest Ordinance, I Stat. 50 (1787). See also AMERICAN INDIANS: U.S. INDIAN POL-
IcY TRIBES AND RESERVATIONS BIA: PAST ANI) PRESENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Published
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior 1984).
136. The Supreme Court in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh held that the doctrines
of discovery and conquest grant a white man the right over land possessed by persons of a
barbaric nature (the Indian nations). Johnson & Graham's Lessee, 21 U.S. at 589-90. But see
VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 (1983),
where the authors argue that historically title to land by discovery was only justifiable when the
property was ownerless. Similarly, in the absence of a just war, the right to conquest can only be
granted by the voluntary consent of the Indians. Id. For a discussion on Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall's effect on the status and recognition of Indians today, see Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sover-
eigns, Civil Rights, and the Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law
Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 495, 496-503 (1994), where the author criticizes past Supreme
Court decisions that dealt with Indians as a product of racism and paternalism. Id. However, in
the twentieth century, the make-up of the Supreme Court changed and favorable decisions for
Indians resulted. id.
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breaking treaties 37 and taking Native American lands until the pass-
ing of the Indian Removal Act of 1830.138
B. The Removal Period
ANDREW JACKSON TO THE CREEK NATION, March 23, 1829:
Friends and brothers, listen: Where you now are, you and my white
children are too near to each other to live in harmony and peace
SPECKLED SNAKE, CREEK CHIEF, IN REPLY:
I have listened to a great many talks from our great father. But they
always began and ended in this-"Get a little further; you are too
near me."
139
In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act (IRA) as a tool
to occupy Native American lands.140 The IRA authorized the use of
military force, if necessary, to compel the relocation of all Native
Americans located east of the Mississippi River to the West.1 41 The
government found support for the IRA in John Locke's theory that
man's right to land stems solely from his use of it.142 The government
reasoned that Native Americans lost all rights to the land because
they had failed to cultivate such rich lands.' 43 The story of the "Trail
137. It is claimed that the United States government violated more than three hundred trea-
ties that it had established with the Indians. Christopher P. Cline, Pursuing Native American
Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Association, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 591 (1991). An example of a treaty broken by the
United States is one that provided that the McKee tribes would relinquish their titles to their
lands, and in exchange the United States government would set aside certain lands for the tribes'
permanent use and occupancy. Id. at 601-02. In addition, the United States was to provide the
tribes with supplies, horses, education, and training. Id. at 602. However, shortly thereafter the
United States Senate rejected the treaty, deciding that because the United States obtained the
land from Mexico, its rights to the land superceded that of the Indians. Id.
138. Indian Removal Act of 1830, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 52-53
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3rd ed. 2000).
139. DippiE, supra note 4, at 45 (quoting NILES WEEKLY REGISTER, Vol. XXXVI 274 (June
13, 1829)).
140. Indian Removal Act, supra note 138, at 52.
141. The Indian Removal Act stated,
[Tihat it shall and may be lawful for the President of the United States to cause so
much of any territory belonging to the United States, west of the river Mississippi, not
included in any state or organized territory, and to which the Indian title has been
extinguished, as he may judge necessary, to be divided into a suitable number of dis-
tricts, for the reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange
the lands where they now reside, and remove there.
Id.
142. See Ward Churchill, The Oppression of the American Indian, available at http://www.
ac.wwu.edu/-n9610899/writings/indians.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
143. Id.
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of Tears," 14 4 which encompasses hunger, fatigue, broken promises,
and the loss of loved ones, best illustrates the effects of the Indian
Removal Act.
In 1791, President George Washington's administration granted the
Cherokee Indian Tribe seventy thousand square miles of territory,
which included parts of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
what was recognized later as Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky. 145
The land was granted under the Treaty of Holston, which also prom-
ised the Cherokees $1,000 for any land that they relinquished.1 46 As
the years passed, the Cherokees ceded more and more land to the
United States government in exchange for promises of money.1 47
However, the United States government never paid the money.' 48
Despite ceding such large amounts of land, the Cherokee Nation
numbered over 13,000 by 1825.149 By that time, the Cherokee Nation
had created its own language and made excellent use of its land by
building brick houses, stores, schools, and a library. 150  With the
growth of strong tribes like the Cherokee Nation, the United States
faced great resistance when trying to enforce the Indian Removal
Act. 151 The Cherokee nation fought its forced removal by lobbying
through newspaper articles that declared its rights to the land accord-
ing to its treaty, which was supposed to be the "supreme law of the
land."' 52
As the United States government was attempting to enforce the In-
dian Removal Act, the Supreme Court decided the case of Worcester
v. Georgia.53 In 1831, Samuel A. Worcester, a missionary among the
Cherokees, was arrested for failing to obey a Georgia law requiring
144. The Cherokee journey from Georgia to Oklahoma has been termed the "Trail of Tears"
because the Native Americans were required to give up their ancestral lands under the most
heinous conditions, which resulted in the loss of numerous lives along the way. DELORIA &
LYTLE, supra note 136, at 7.
145. JOAN GILBERT, THE TRAIL OF TEARS ACROSS MISSOURI 5-26 (1996).
146. JACKSON, supra note 130, at 267. Article VII of the Treaty of Holston reaffirmed the
Cherokees right to the land by stating, "[this treaty] solemnly guarantee[s] to the Cherokee
nation all their lands not hereby ceded." Id.
147. Id. at 269-70. In 1816, the Cherokees gave up all lands in South Carolina in exchange for
a promise of $5000, and by 1817 more land was ceded with promises of new homes west of the
Mississippi River. Id. at 270. After years of broken promises, in 1822, the Cherokees refused to
give up any more land to the United States government. Id. at 271-72.
148. Id.
149. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 7.
150. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 6-9.
151. Id. at 9-16.
152. Article VI of the United States Constitution, which defines treaties as the "supreme law
of the land" supported the Cherokees' right to the land under the Treaty of Holston.
153. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
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persons of white ancestry to take an oath of allegiance to the state and
obtain a permit to live on a reservation before moving onto a reserva-
tion.' 54 The Court, in Worcester, overturned the Georgia Superior
Court's holding in which Worchester was sentenced to four years in
the state penitentiary.' 55 The Court held that the state laws of Geor-
gia did not apply on Native American lands. 156 In particular, Chief
Justice John Marshall stated,
The Cherokee nation is then, a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Geor-
gia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress.' 57
This ruling supported the Cherokee Nation's claim that the United
States did not have a right under the IRA to force its removal. 58 In
response to the Supreme Court's decision, President Andrew Jackson
stated, "[Chief Justice John] Marshall has made his law, now let him
enforce it."' 59 The executive branch then proceeded to ignore the Su-
preme Court's ruling,160 forcing the removal of tribes by military per-
sonnel.' 61 Eventually, the government prevailed over the Native
Americans, and thousands of deaths ensued along the "Trail of
Tears." 16 2
"People were often rushed out of their homes with nothing but the
clothes on their back .... Time was not always allowed to get children
in from play or work. Husbands came home to find families gone."' 163
All members of the Cherokee tribe, which was considered one of the
most civilized, were forced from their homes by the United States mil-
itary and required to relocate in the West after the prospect of gold
was found on their land. 164 The removal process entailed walking fif-
154. Id. at 537-38.
155. Id. at 562.
156. Id. at 561.
157. Id.
158. Because Chief Justice Marshall, in Worcester, found that state laws were not applicable
on Indian lands, states could not legally, in accordance to the holding of the case, force the
removal of Indians from their lands. Id. at 561-62.
159. Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on
Indian Law and Policy, The Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47
OKLA. L. REV. 111, 114 (1994).
160. For a discussion on the effects of President Andrew Jackson's failure to adhere to the
Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, see Strickland, supra note 159, at 124-25.
161. NORGREN, supra note 134, at 143 (noting that pursuant to the Treaty of New Echota the
Cherokees were removed at the hands of U.S. troops).
162. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 32.
163. Id. at 32-33.
164. Id.
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teen to twenty miles a day in sub-zero temperatures without the
proper attire to stay warm. 165 At every stop, there were anywhere
from four to ten bodies to bury, most often as a result of fatigue or
illness.' 66 It has been estimated that approximately 4,000 Cherokees
(fifty percent of the tribe) died during this removal process. 167 As a
result of the United States' federal policies, including the IRA and
others, as well as the United States' military personnel, the Cherokees
were successfully removed from the East; however, they left behind a
"Trail of Tears."
C. Ward of the Government and the Allotment Period
The removal of all tribes from the East to western reservations did
not sufficiently fulfill the principles of Manifest Destiny,16 spurring
the United States to abandon the traditional treaty system. This aban-
donment furthered the destruction of Native Americans. 69 On
March 3, 1871, hidden within the text of an Indian appropriation bill,
Congress outlawed any future treaties with Native Americans. 170 The
appropriation bill stated that "no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty."'' Thereby, the government abolished the
recognition of Indian tribes as sovereign nations and inevitably took
away their only bargaining tool, the right to govern their land as they
wished. 72 As a result, Native Americans became wards of the gov-
ernment, losing control of their land, the private education of their
children, their traditions, and ultimately, their identity.
Traditionally, land occupied by Native Americans had been held
collectively, which meant that no individual had the power to act for
the tribe as a whole. Yet in 1887, the General Allotment Act (Dawes
Act) 73 altered this traditional ownership by granting each Native
American a fee simple in the land with a twenty-five year trust.' 74
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Sharon Johnston, The Genocide of Native American: A Sociological View, available at
http://isis.csuhayward.edu/ALSS/soc/NAN/dd/6800sj/slj.htm (last visited March 7, 2002).
168. For a definition of "Manifest Destiny," see supra note 10.
169. Johnston, supra note 167.
170. ABOLITION OF TREATY MAKING, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 136
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3rd ed. 2000).
171. Id. See also DInPIE, supra note 4, at 144-145.
172. DIPPIE, supra note 4, at 144-145
173. General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) § 1, 5, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 138, at 170.
174. Id. at 173.
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Parcels of land were granted to individual Native Americans, while
the "remaining land" was given or sold to whites. In many cases, the
land parceled out by the government had been the land occupied by
Native Americans under the treaty agreement; therefore, the "re-
maining land" was really land owned by Native Americans, but pur-
chased by whites following the allotment. 175
The conditions of the deeds were largely dependent on the race of
the individual. For example, full-blooded Indians were granted longer
trust periods because they were viewed as less competent than mixed-
blooded 176 individuals who were sometimes granted fee simples with-
out trusts.
17 7
The government hoped that by individualizing ownership of the
land, it would encourage Native Americans to cultivate the land and
become civilized farmers.17 8 In support of transforming the "savage
beast" into a civilized farmer, Indian Commissioner Hiram Price
stated, "Labor is an essential element in producing civilization ....
The greatest kindness the government can bestow upon the Indian is
to teach him to labor for his own support, thus developing his true
manhood, and, as a consequence, making him self-relying and self-
supporting. '"179
In fact, according to Section 6 of the Dawes Act, as each Indian
accepted his individual plot of land, he became a United States citi-
zen. 180 Ultimately, the government's goal of turning Native Ameri-
cans into civilized farmers largely failed, and at the end of the trust
period, many Native Americans lost their land for failure to maintain
good credit.t 81 As a result, two-thirds, or approximately eighty-seven
million acres, of Indian lands held in 1887 were lost to the United
States government by 1934.182
175. DELOS S. OTIS, DAWES AC-," AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 86-88 (Francis
Paul Prucha ed. 1980).
176. Mixed Bloods commonly referred to a mixture of white and Indian.
177. Ward Churchill & Glenn T. Morris, The State of Native Americans Crucible of American
Indian Identity, available at http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/fed98ward.htm (last visited Apr.
8, 2002).
178. OTIS, supra note 175, at 8-32.
179. Indian Commissioner Price on Civilizing the Indians, October 24, 1881, reprinted in Doc-
UMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 138, at 155-56.
180. General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), supra note 138, at 171. See also, Porter, supra note
10, at 119 (discussing how forcing American citizenship on Indians was another act of genocide
committed by the United States government, by which the Indian race has suffered much insta-
bility based on identifying with their ethnicity and nationality).
181. Id. at 122.
182. Id. at 122-23. See also OTIS, supra note 175, at 87 (noting that "of the 155,632,312 acres
of Indian lands in 1881, there were 104,314,349 acres left in 1890 and 77,865,373 in 1900").
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The forced removal of the Cherokee Nation, in opposition to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Worcester, and the taking of
Indian lands resulted in the loss of numerous lives and scared lands,
thereby creating feelings of powerlessness for all Native Americans. 83
To date, not one individual or agency has been held accountable for
the deaths that resulted from the forced removal of all Indian tribes
from the East to the West. In 1946, the United States government
established the Indian Claims Commission 8 4 with a mandate to en-
sure that those Native Americans who had suffered the illegal expro-
priation of their lands by the United States would "receive justice."18t 5
However, many doubted the ability of the Commission to ensure jus-
tice for Native Americans; instead, the Commission was viewed as a
consequence of the United States' plan to prosecute the Nazis at Nu-
remberg for committing "Crimes Against Humanity." 186 These crimes
included the forced removal of the Jewish population into concentra-
tion camps, the sterilization of Jewish individuals, and the extermina-
tion of thousands of Jews.' 87
The movement to sterilize Jewish individuals in Nazi Germany was
largely based on the eugenics movement in the United States, which
promoted the sterilization of certain individuals with "undesirable
traits."188 In fact, Hilter's 1933 Law for the Prevention of Offspring
with Hereditary Diseases'" contained language similar to a Virginia
statute allowing for the involuntary sterilization of feeble minded
persons.1 910
In the United States, the eugenics movement began with the sterili-
zation of "imbeciles and feeble minded persons" and transitioned into
183. Porter, supra note 10, at 161-69.
184. The Indian Claims Commission Act, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES IN-
DIAN POLICY, supra note 136, at 231-233. The Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946
granted the Commission the authority to hear and adjudicate the following claims, in pertinent
part, brought by Native Americans against the United States government:
(1) claims in law or equity arising under the Constitution, laws, treaties of the United
States, and Executive orders of the President; ... (4) claims arising from the taking by
the United States, whether as the result of a treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands
owned or occupied by the claimant without the payment for such lands of compensa-
tion agreed to by the claimant
Id. at 231.
185. WARD CHURCHILL & GLEN T. MORRIS, KEY INDIAN LAWS AND CASES: THE STATE OF
NATIVE AMERICA, 13-21 (1998).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Bill Baskervill, Phony Science Rendered 60,000 Americans Sterile, RICHMOND TIMEs-DIs-
PATCH at CI, March 19, 2000.
189. Id. at C6.
190. id.
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the sterilization of minorities because of their minority status. This
included the sterilization of Native American women. 191 These sterili-
zation efforts constituted an attempt to destroy, in whole or in part,
the Native American population.
D. The Involuntary Sterilization of Native American Women
"Eugenics" is defined as "a science that deals with the improvement
(as by control of human mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or
breed."'192 In the early 1900s, the United States, with the help of nu-
merous American scientists, implemented the theory of eugenics by
creating, mandating, and funding programs that sterilized individuals
possessing "undesirable traits."' 193
"The first sterilization law ... passed in 1907 .. .provided for the
prevention of the procreation of confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles,
and rapists."'1 94 These programs were later endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Buck v. Bell,195 which allowed a physician, acting under the
auspices of the government, to perform an operation that was neither
desired by the patient nor medically necessary. 196 Carrie Buck, the
daughter of a "feeble-minded" woman, was diagnosed as being of
"moral imbecility," and as a result of this diagnosis, Virginia law man-
dated that Carrie be sterilized. 197 Virginia legalized the compulsory
sterilization of persons "afflicted with a hereditary form of insanity or
imbecility." 198 The Supreme Court rejected Buck's argument that
such programs violated her equal protection and due process rights. 199
The Court, in upholding the law, reasoned, "It is better for all the
191. Rennard Strickland, Taking the Train to Tomorrow: Learning to See Beyond the Prison
Gates, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15, 19-21 (1996).
192. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 428 (1987). It is estimated that the
eugenics movement left more than 60,000 Americans unable to have children. Baskervill, supra
note 188, at C6.
193. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 59-65 (1997); Stephanie Hyatt, A Shared History of Shame: Sweden's
Four-Decade Policy of Forced Sterilization and the Eugenics Movement in the United States, 8
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 487- 97 (1998).
194. Hyatt, supra note 193, at 490. See also Bruce E. Johansen, Sterilization of Native Ameri-
can Women Reviewed by Omaha Master's Student, at http://www.ratical.org/ratville/sterilize.html
(last visited March 11, 2002). By 1930, thirty states and Puerto Rico had established mandatory
sterilization laws for various criminal acts and moral turpitudes. Id. Eleven of those states al-
lowed for the sterilization of epileptics, while in Iowa a person declared a "menace to society"
could be required under court order to lose his or her reproductive rights. Id.
195. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
196. Hyatt, supra note 193, at 491.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 491-92.
199. ROBERTS, supra note 193, at 59-65.
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world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.... Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough. ''20°
By 1973, an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 indigent women had been
sterilized annually under federally funded programs. 201 Thereafter, a
study showed that more than half of those women were African
American. 20 2  Similar sterilization programs were implemented
against Puerto Rican203 and Native American women during this
time.2 0 4 These activities, however, were not committed without public
outcry from the victims subjected to forced sterilization.
On June 14, 1973, at the Montgomery Family Planning Clinic, four-
teen-year-old Mary Alice Reif and twelve-year-old Minnie Lee Relf
were subjected to an irreversible surgical tubal sterilization without
their knowledge or consent.20 5  In the case that followed, Relf v.
United States,20 6 the victims claimed that the doctor's failure to issue
and distribute the sterilization guidelines was negligent and led to
their involuntary sterilizations. 20 7 The doctor who was employed by
the Montgomery Family Planning Clinic under the auspices of the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity claimed that he was immune from pros-
ecution because of his role as a federal officer. 20 8 In the end, the case
was dismissed, and the court found that the doctor met the test for
200. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
201. Id. See also Reif v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974); Charles England,
A Look at the Indian Health Service Policy of Sterilization, 1972-1976, at http://www.dick-
shovel.com/IHSSterPol.html (last visited March II, 2002) (stating "Dr. Louis Hellman, the Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs in the PHS [Public Health Service], presented
statistics confirming that 150,000 low income people were sterilized in the U.S. from federal
grants.").
202. ROBERTS, supra note 193, at 93.
203. The International Planned Parenthood Federation and the Puerto Rican government,
with the support of federal funds, waged a crusade to sterilize all Puerto Rican women. Ron-
ERTS, supra note 193, at 94-97. By 1968, more than one-third of the women of childbearing age
in Puerto Rico had been successfully sterilized. Id. at 94-97. More recently, as of 1982, thirty-
five percent of Puerto Rican women had been sterilized. Charles Rutherford, Reproductive
Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 273-74 (1992). For a
discussion on the sterilization movement in Puerto Rico, see Laura Briggs, Discourses of "Forced
Sterilization" in Puerto Rico: The Problem with the Speaking Subaltern, 10 DIFFERENCES: J. FEM.
CULT. STUDIES 1 (1998).
204. For a detailed discussion on the sterilization of Native American women, see infra notes
210-220.
205. Reif v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Taunya Lovell
Banks, Women and Aids-Racism, Sexism, and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
351, 361 (1990).
206. Relf, 433 F. Supp. at 424.
207. Id. at 429.
208. Id. at 424.
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absolute immunity because his actions were within the scope of his
employment and his position demanded freedom to make similar
types of decisions without repercussions. 20 9
Similarly, in 1977, ten Mexican American women sued Los Angeles
County for failing to obtain their consent before performing surgical
sterilizations on them.210 In deciding the case, the court found that
there was a mere lack of communication, and as a result, the doctors
who conducted the surgeries were never held accountable. 211 These
same manipulation tactics used by the United States government to
sterilize persons of minority descent, as well as the outcry of the vic-
tims caught within the government's control, can be found throughout
the Native American community.
As early as the 1930s, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the aus-
pices of the Indian Health Services, began to execute a covert pro-
gram designed to sterilize all Native American women. 212 As a result,
sterilization became a regular practice at various Native American
hospitals. The sterilization procedure was carried out under the guise
of medical necessity to protect the woman's health, or in the alterna-
tive, the procedure was performed without the woman's knowledge or
consent.21 3 Between the early 1970s and early 1980s, these programs
forcibly sterilized more than forty-two percent of all Native American
women of childbearing age.214 For many small Indian tribes, this led
to an almost complete elimination of their entire tribe.215
In the early 1970s, at the urging of Senator James Abourezk of
South Dakota, the General Accounting Office investigated the com-
plaints of various Native American women who were subjected to
forced sterilization procedures. 216 The investigation was conducted
209. Id. at 429-31.
210. Banks, supra note 205, at 362-63.
211. Id.
212. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 249-250. Interestingly, in 1955, Indian Health Services was
transferred from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Public Health Service in hopes of improving
health care on Native American Reservations. England, supra note 201.
213. Strickland, supra note 8, at 328.
214. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 249-250. See also Rutherford, supra note 203, at 273-74.
The author found that as of 1982, forty-two percent of Native American women had been steril-
ized. Id.
215. Because of the small population of certain tribes, the sterilization of one-third or more of
a tribe's women impeded on a tribe's ability to reproduce and replenish its population. Simi-
larly, the Bureau of Indian Affairs admitted that between 1920 and 1925 Indians averaged 22.8
deaths per 1,000 persons each year, which was double the rate of the white population. Many
speculated that the "increase of forty-eight percent in the Indian death rate could lead to the
extinction of the entire population in another quarter of a century." DIPPIE, supra note 4, at 345.
216. England, supra note 201.
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and funded by the federal government. 217 The General Accounting
Office found that the Indian Health Services' consent procedures
lacked any type of informed consent.2 18
In 1976, the Indian Health Services was formally eliminated, and
the sterilizations stopped. 219 Yet, this was not before the government,
through the Indian Health Services, had forcibly sterilized approxi-
mately 70,000 Native American women during its time of
operation.220
E. The Destruction of the Native American Tradition,
Language, and Culture
"Gaa wiin daa-aangoshkigaazo ahaw enaabiyaan gaa-inaabid," is an
Ojibwe saying that translates in English to "You can not destroy one
who has dreamed a dream like mine." To various Native Americans,
the Ojibwe language symbolizes a special bond, as it is their method of
communication and a tool for distinguishing between tribes. The
United States government destroyed this special bond, various other
traditions, and the Native American identity by the involuntary indoc-
trination of American ideals.221
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787222 promised to provide the means
to obtain a suitable education for all Native American people; how-
ever, money did not begin to flow to Indian reservations until the late
1870s.2 23 This allocation of resources brought about the rise of the
federal Indian boarding school system, which took children away from
their homes in order to "civilize" them.224 In fact, between 1879 and
the early 1900s, Congress appropriated money to build more than one
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Bill Wagner, Lo the Poor and Sterilized Indian, AMERICA 75, Jan. 29, 1977).
219. Id.
220. Anthony J. Hall, Lighting A Candle or Exploding Bombs for Humanity? Ethnic Cleans-
ing and Genocide in North America and Kosovo, at http://www.ualberta.ca/-nativest/pim/geno-
cide.html (last visited March 11, 2002) (quoting Bruce E. Johansen in Cornell University's
Native Americans); Strickland, supra note 191, at 20-21.
221. For a discussion on how the forcing of American citizenship upon Indians destroyed their
traditions, see Porter, supra note 10, at 161-69. See also Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with
Words: Native Americans' Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 905-908 (1999), where the author explores the effects of the suppression of Indian
languages.
222. Northwest Ordinance, I Stat. 50 (1787)
223. Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation's
Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 950 (1999).
224. The federally funded boarding school system was paralleled to the system of religious
boarding schools run by Christian missionaries. See Matt Kelley, American Indian Boarding
Schools: "That Hurt Never Goes Away" (April 28, 1999) at http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWSFea-
tures9904/28_indians.html (last visited March 11, 2002).
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hundred off-reservation boarding schools. 225 In 1885, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs issued regulations for Indian schools, which included an
English only policy.226 In 1887, in support of the English only policy,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, F.D.C. Atkins, in his Annual Re-
port of the Commission of Indian Affairs reasoned,
This language [English], which is good enough for a white man and
a black man, ought to be good enough for the red man. It is also
believed that teaching an Indian youth in his own barbarous dialect
is a positive detriment to him. The first step to be taken toward
civilization, toward teaching the Indians the mischief and folly of
continuing in their barbarous practices, is to teach them the English
language. 227
Therefore, Native American students were required to relinquish
their given name for one in the English language, and were forced to
respond to a name they did not recognize in a language they did not
understand. 228 In fact, students were often punished if they were
caught speaking their first language. 229
The Carlisle Indian Industrial School in Pennsylvania,230 recognized
as the most prominent school for Indians in the United States, served
as a model for other Indian schools.231 Richard Henry Pratt, the head
of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, a former Captain in the army,
and veteran of the Civil War, pledged to run the school and its stu-
dents by "kill[ing] the Indian in [the student] and sav[ing] the man. 232
A similar motto or mission statement for the educational practices of
Native Americans existed in all other boarding schools.2 33 As a result,
a typical arrival at a boarding school consisted of the removal of all
distinguishing characteristics associated with being Indian, such as the
225. DELORES J. HUFF, To LIVE HEROICALLY: INSTITUTIONAL RACISM AND AMERICAN IN-
DIAN EDUCATION 4 (1997).
226. The United States government hoped that by regulating the language the Indians spoke,
they would successfully eradicate the "inferior" language from use. See PETER IVERSON, WE
ARE STILL HERE: AMERICAN INDIANS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21-23 (1998); Dussias, supra
note 221, at 905-908.
227. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 21, 1887, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 170, at 174. See also Dussias, supra
note 221, at 905.
228. Dussias, supra note 221, at 905.
229. Gerald L. "Jerry" Brown, Reeve Love, & Bradley Scott, An Historical Overview of In-
dian Education and Four Generations of Desegregation, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 407, 410-11
(1999).
230. The Carlisle Indian School opened in November 1, 1879, and the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs closed its doors in 1918. DIPPIE, supra note 4, at 113-21.
231. Id.
232. See IVERSON, supra note 226, at 21.
233. Alison McKinny Brown, Native American Education: A System in Need of Reform, 2
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 105, 107 (1993).
942 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:911
cutting of long hair, the removal of traditional tribal dress, and the
renouncement of tribal religions. 234
The curriculum of most schools consisted of a half-day of classroom
instruction, while the rest of the day consisted of manual labor.235
Many historians claim that such manual labor required strength and
capabilities that children between the ages of ten to twelve did not
possess, especially considering the lack of nourishment provided to
the children by the schools. 236 The curriculum also included the in-
doctrination of Christianity, the Lockian theory of private property,
and patriarchy.2 37 As a result, any student who was caught with an
Indian medicine bundle was paddled. 238
Native American boarding schools, including Carlisle used an "out-
ing system," which involved the transfer of a child from the school
into the home of a white family to indoctrinate the children in the
American way of life. 239 This system was one of the quickest and
most successful means of civilizing Native American children because
the children had constant contact with American work ethics, patriot-
ism, and values. A study conducted by the Association on American
Indian Affairs in the 1970s showed that twenty-five to thirty-five per-
cent of Native American children were transferred from their homes
into foster care or adoptive families.2 40 Interestingly, eighty-five per-
cent of those alternative placements were with Non-Indian homes. 241
In 1891, Congress passed the Indian Appropriation Act, which re-
quired all Native American children to attend school and authorized
234. Id.
235. Carolyn J. Marr, Assimilation Through Education: Indian Boarding Schools in the
Pacifica Northwest, at http://content.lib.washington.edu/aipnw/marr/page5.html (last visited
March l1, 2002).
236. HUFF, supra note 225, at 9-10. It is reported that children in federally financed boarding
schools were fed on eleven cents a day, while their meals commonly consisted of moldy molasses
and weak coffee. Id. See Kelley, supra note 224.
237. Kelley, supra note 224. See also Carla Christofferson, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect
Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 176-
77 (1991), where the author noted that "Native American women have suffered a longer history
of discrimination in the United States than any minority group" because of the government's
policies of assimilation, termination, and genocides. Id. Moreover, the author argued that Na-
tive Americans historically were nonsexist and "women enjoyed equal rights with men and in
some cases were even considered superior to men." Id. However, the United States govern-
ment's policies toward Native Americans altered these nonsexist views immensely. Id.
238. Kelley, supra note 224.
239. Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan, Supplemental Report on Indian Education, December
1, 1889, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 170.
240. David Woodward, The Rights of Reservation Parents and Children: Cultural Survival or
the Final Termination, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL
AN) RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 101, 101-02 (John R. Wunder ed. 1996).
241. Id. at 102.
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the Bureau of Indian Affairs to withhold federal rations from any In-
dian family who refused to send their child away to school.242 In order
to survive, Native American families had no choice but to allow their
children to be taken to boarding school because they were often the
only schools available for Native American children.243 Upon arrival
at the boarding school, the children were not allowed to speak to their
families in order to accelerate the assimilation process.244  Subse-
quently, students who cried from homesickness were often beaten,
and those who attempted to run away were often chained in makeshift
jails as punishment.2 45 All of these acts, the beatings and the regula-
tions, were carried out with the specific purpose of assimilating the
"savage beast" to the white man's way of life in order to destroy all
things Indian.246
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 brought about the end of the
federal government's policy of forcibly transferring Native American
children to boarding schools and white families. Acknowledging the
history of removing Native American children from their homes, Con-
gress found "that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly
high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions '247 In response to the destruction of
the Native American family at the hands of the United States govern-
ment, the Indian Child Welfare Act designated procedures for both
adoption and foster care in the hope of prohibiting the future transfer
242. Brown, supra note 233, at 107.
243. Brown, supra note 233, at 107.
244. Kelley, supra note 224.
245. Id. See Floyd Stephen Mowatt, Sr. v. Derek Clarke, The Anglican Church of Canada, et
al., Docket No. 7838, at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb%2Dtxt/sc/99/13/s99%2D341.txt (last
visited March 11, 2002), for a discussion on the prevalence of abuse of students at Residential
Schools in Canada. The Supreme Court of British Columbia held the Anglican Church of Ca-
nada, the General Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada, the Anglican Diocese of Cariboo,
the Synod of the Diocese, and the Queen of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Indian
Affairs, responsible for the sexual abuse of a student at the hands of his dormitory supervisor.
Floyd Stephen Mowatt, Sr. v. Derek Clarke, The Anglican Church of Canada, et al., Docket No.
7838, at http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb%2Dtxt/sc/99/13/s99%2D1341.txt (last visited March 11,
2002). See also The Anglican Church of Canada, Residential Schools: Legacy and Response, at
http://www.anglican.ca/ministry/rs/litigation/ (last visited March 11, 2002) (highlighting the fact
that, at present, approximately 7,000 survivors of Canadian Residential Schools are suing the
government of Canada; the Anglican Church is named as a co-defendant in approximately 1,200
of those cases).
246. IVERSON, supra note 226.
247. Indian Child Welfare Act, November 8, 1978, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 138, at 294-95.
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of Native American children into non-Native American homes with-
out parental consent.2 48
IV. ANALYSIS: THE AMERICAN GENOCIDE: COMMITTED WITHIN
OUR BORDERS BY OUR GOVERNMENT
As early as the 1800s, the United States government implemented
measures calculated to destroy, in whole or in part, the Native Ameri-
can population. These measures, which included the forced relocation
of Native Americans, the sterilization of Native American women,
and the destruction of the cultural unit by the transfer of Native
American children to boarding schools, were in clear violation of cus-
tomary international law and the Genocide Convention, in particular
Articles 11(c), (d), and (e), respectively. 249
To date, no government, agency, or individual has been held ac-
countable for the genocidal acts committed by the United States gov-
ernment, its agencies, and its personnel against the Native American
population. According to customary international law, which embod-
ies the universal condemnation by states of the crime of genocide, the
United States government and its actors, as perpetrators of acts of
genocide, must be held accountable for these acts. 250 Similarly, the
United States, as a party to the Genocide Convention, can be held in
violation of the Convention for not prosecuting or extraditing the per-
sons responsible.25 1  As a result, the problem of accountability
remains.
In order to hold persons accountable for the crime of genocide
within the United States there must be proof of genocide as enumer-
ated under Article II, conspiracy to commit genocide, an attempt to
commit genocide, or complicity to commit genocide committed by
United States citizens or within the boundaries of the United
States. 252 Similarly, the specific intent to "destroy, in whole or in part,
248. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c)(1994) states: "In any voluntary proceeding for termination of paren-
tal rights to, or adoptive placement of an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be with-
drawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption."
Similarly, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv)(a) states: "consent to adoption.., shall be or become irrevoca-
ble." See Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis, in
NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: RECENT LEGAL ISSUES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS, 1968 TO
IrHE PRESENT 219 (John R. Wunder ed., 1997), for a discussion on the effects of the transfer of
children from their homes into non-Indian homes and a critique of the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978.
249. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Article II(c), (d), (e).
250. See supra notes 36-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the obligations of cus-
tomary international law.
251. SCHAnAS, supra note 58, at 525.
252. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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[a protected group]" must be shown. 253 This intent can be proven
through various means, such as evidence of written or oral orders to
eliminate a specific group, the labeling of a protected group as an en-
emy of a state, or a systematic and destructive pattern of behavior
with respect to a specific group.254 The existence of various United
States governmental philosophies, policies, orders, and legislative acts
regulating against Native American persons prove the requisite intent
to commit the crime of genocide against those individuals.
A. The Implementation of the Philosophy of Manifest Destiny
When Jimmy Carter was running for the presidency, somebody
asked him, in a T.V. interview, "for how long did your family have
the farm?" He said, "ever[ ] since the Indians went away." That is
not exactly how one would describe the Trail of Tears-went away
with bayonets at their backs, perhaps. Five thousand Cherokees
die[d] on that forced march, a third of the nation was exterminated.
These are things we can no longer ignore.255
The United States government adopted the philosophy of "Manifest
Destiny," which involved the taking of all Indian lands and the exter-
mination of the Indian population in order to accomplish the goal of
expansion into the West. 256 Under the auspices of this philosophy, the
United States government forced the relocation of the "savage
beast. '2 57 The journey began on a hot summer day when most Cher-
okees were forced from their homes with only the summer clothes on
their backs and possibly a few other personal items.2 58 The trip con-
tinued through the winter when the Native Americans were subjected
to the sub-zero temperatures typical of the region.259 The conditions
of the trip were intolerable for most able-bodied individuals, let alone
those who were ill, young, or elderly.2 60 Further, many had to walk
because the government had provided only one wagon for every
twenty people and one saddle horse for every four people. 26' As a
result, many of the Cherokees were forced to walk approximately six-
253. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Article I1.
254. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 60, at 34.
255. Rennard Strickland, Things Not Spoken: The Burial of Native American History, Law
and Culture, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 11, 17 (2000).
256. CHURCHILL supra note 10, at 37.
257. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 38-41. See also supra notes 126-190 and accompanying text.





teen miles per day. 262 One man in charge of leading the Cherokees to
the West stated,
On the morning of November 17th we encountered a terrific sleet
and a snow storm with freezing temperatures and that day ... the
suffering of the Cherokees [was] awful. The trail of exiles was a
trail of death. . . . They had to sleep in the wagons and on the
ground without fire. And I have known an many as twenty-two...
to die in one night of pneumonia. 263
Death was common along the "Trail of Tears" due to exhaustion, the
sub-zero temperatures, and the lack of medical supplies to treat dis-
ease.264 As a result, death was often a result of fatigue, pneumonia, or
other deadly diseases.265
The government's practice along the "Trail of Tears" is clearly pro-
scribed and prohibited under the Genocide Convention. Article 11(c)
of the Genocide Convention prohibits "deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion, in whole or in part. '266 The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda interpreted provision II(c) of the Genocide Convention to
include "subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes, and the reduction of essential medical services
below minimum requirement.'267
The United States government, under the mandate of Manifest
Destiny, had the specific intent to remove the Cherokees from their
homes with the intent that such removal would lead to their destruc-
tion. This was the final step in the plan of Manifest Destiny when
assimilation failed. 268 Even though the United States Supreme Court,
in the case of Worcester v. Georgia, rejected the application of state
law on Indian territories, the United States government, with the help
of the military, forced the removal of the Cherokee Nation in accor-
dance with the Indian Removal Act of 1830.269 After the Cherokees
were removed, they were forced to walk thousands of miles in the
dead of winter without sufficient clothes or medical supplies.270 Any
262. Id.
263. Id. at 38.
264. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 38.
265. Id.
266. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Article II (c).
267. SCHABAS, supra note 58, at 166 (quoting from the case of Prosecutor v. Akayesu) (em-
phasis added).
268. See DIPI'IE supra note 4, at 45-46, where the author notes that President Andrew Jackson
advocated the forced relocation of the Indians because they were too close to his white children.
269. Indian Removal Act of 1830, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 52
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3rd ed. 2000).
270. GILBERT, supra note 145, at 38.
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reasonable person should have known that such conditions would in-
evitably cause the death and destruction of the population forced to
endure such a journey. The United States government that imple-
mented the Indian Removal Act, the military personnel who forced
the Cherokees from their home, and the persons who led the Cher-
okees from their homes to the West committed acts of genocide in
violation of customary international law and the Genocide
Convention.
The forced removal of the Cherokees from the East to the West is
analogous to the forced removal of Armenians from the Ottoman
Empire beginning in 1915. The Turks, under the auspices of a "reset-
tlement policy" forced the removal of all Armenians from the Otto-
man Empire. 271 In reality, the "resettlement policy" represented the
government's means of fulfilling their plan of racial exclusivity. The
removal process took place with little warning, a three-day notice was
average, and some Armenians were removed by trains and wagons,
and many more were forced to walk.272 The blistering hot days and
freezing cold nights, the failure of the government to make provisions
for food and housing along the journey, and various diseases caused
the death of seventy-five percent of the Armenians who were forced
on the journey.273 Furthermore, they were given only scraps of food,
and if they felt sick, they were left to die.27 4
These acts committed by the Turks were declared violations
"against the laws of humanity" by the Commission on the Responsi-
bilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. 275
The breaches detailed by the Commission were similar to what we
know as the crime of genocide today. Even though the Turks were
not held accountable for their actions, they would have been held ac-
countable had justice not been exchanged for a political compro-
mise.27 6 Accordingly, it is evident that the forced removal of persons
271. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 105-114
(1981). It is estimated that approximately 800,000 Armenians were murdered. Id. See also
Hovannisian, supra note 58, at 123-26.
272. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 31-31, 32-33 (noting the ruthless nature of the Turkish policy
of expulsion and resettlement).
273. KUPER, supra note 271.
274. Id.
275. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity For International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
409, 413 (2000) (stating that the Commission found that the "systematic killing of a civilian pop-
ulation pursuant to state policy ... violated the 'laws of humanity,' [and] charge[d] the officials
with 'crimes against humanity'").
276. Id. Although the Commission found that there had been a violation of the laws of hu-
manity, the United States and Japan opposed using the theory that the Turks had committed
crimes against humanity to prosecute the individuals involved. Id.
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with knowledge that such removal would endanger lives is prohibited
by international law.
The similarities between the actions taken by the Turks and those
made by the United States government in the removal of the Cher-
okees from the East to the West are striking. The government of the
Turks and the United States government, their agencies, and their per-
sonnel orchestrated the removal of an ethnic minority with the intent
to destroy the particular group by subjecting them to conditions likely
to cause their destruction. Further, the acts of both countries were
genocidal and in violation of customary international law and the Ge-
nocide Convention. The only difference between the two situations is
that the forced removal of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire has
been recognized as a violation of customary international law; how-
ever, the removal of the Cherokees from the East to the West and the
deaths that ensued have not been declared in violation of any national
or international law.
It is important to note that at the time of the "Trail of Tears," the
crime of genocide, as defined today by the Genocide Convention, had
not yet been established. Even though the acts committed by the
United States government, its agencies, and its personnel can be
clearly recognized as genocidal in nature, for purposes of accountabil-
ity and reparation, the perpetrators of the "Trail of Tears" would need
to be found in "violation of the laws of humanity," as in the case of
the Armenian Genocide.
The justifications for the removal of Indian tribes from the East to
the West have been largely financial and rooted in the need to expand
the strength and security of the United States. At the end of the Rev-
olutionary War, the United States was forced to balance the interests
of the United States as a whole against that of the Native Americans,
and the interests of the United States won.
B. The Destruction of the Native American Woman's
Ability to Reproduce
During a discussion regarding the proposed Genocide Convention,
Idaho's Senator Frank Church provided the following testimony to
Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist:
CHURCH: Another extreme criticism leveled at the Convention is
that it would make birth control efforts ... an act of genocide.
REHNQUIST: I think that any birth control effort that might reason-
ably be contemplated in this country would certainly be a voluntary
one, and would likewise be directed towards all individuals rather
than any particular race. I think it inconceivable that any sort of
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birth control effort that would ever receive public approval in this
county would violated the provisions of this treaty.
CHURCH: Is it true that if any such effort were to be made, based
upon some compulsory method and directed toward some particu-
lar group, that the protections of the Constitution would be fully
applicable whether or not the United States had ratified and be-
come party to the Genocide Convention?
REHNQUIST: Certainly. 277
Little did Mr. Rehnquist know that as early as the 1930s, the United
States government had implemented forced sterilization programs
against several minority groups. From his testimony, it is clear that
Senator Church was worried that he could be held accountable for
these programs under the Genocide Convention. The implementation
of sterilization programs against Native Americans was designed to
destroy their ability to reproduce, which could have led to the com-
plete elimination of small tribes.278 These programs violated Article
11(d) of the Genocide Convention, which prohibits "imposing mea-
sures intended to prevent births within the group" with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group.279 The Secretariat Draft of the Genocide Convention sug-
gested that such "measures," as mentioned in Article 11(d), could in-
clude sterilization and/or compulsory abortion, segregation of the
sexes, and obstacles to marriage.280 The mens rea 281 required by the
Genocide Convention is the specific intent "to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group," while the actus
reus 282 requires only the implementation of the measures. 283 There-
fore, there is no requirement that the measure, when implemented,
must result in the successful prevention of births within the group. As
a result, any person who carries out an act of sterilization with the
intent that such action would destroy, in whole or in part, the Native
277. CHURCHILL, supra note 8, at 377-78 (quoting the Hearings on the Genocide Convention
(1970), pp.18-19).
278. For a review of the United States government policies regarding the sterilization against
Native Americans, see supra notes 192-220 and accompanying text.
279. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at Article 11(d).
280. SCHABAS, supra note 58, at 173-74.
281. Mens reas can be defined as the requisite intent necessary to find a person guilty of the
crime at hand. In the case of genocide, the Genocide Convention under Article II requires the
"specific intent," not general intent, to "destroy, in whole or in part" a protected group. Geno-
cide Convention, supra note 6, at art. II.
282. Actus reas can be defined as the physical act necessary to find a person guilty of an act.
In the case of genocide, the person being prosecuted does not have to carry out the genocide, but
he must only take measures in furtherance of committing the act of genocide. Genocide Con-
vention, supra note 6, at art. II.
283. Id.
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American race has committed an act of genocide and must be held
accountable.
After rumors of sterilization spread throughout various reserva-
tions, the Northern Cheyennes' chief tribal judge, Marie Sanchez, in-
vestigated the prevalence of sterilization in the Indian country.284 In
the late 1970s, Judge Sanchez encountered two fifteen year-old girls
who recounted how physicians at the Indian Health Services hospital
had told them that their tonsils were being removed, but instead the
physicians removed their ovaries.2 85 As a result of this surgery, both
girls were left unable to reproduce.2 86 In this case, the act of removing
the girls' ovaries without their consent would undoubtedly meet the
required actus reas because such measures could or would prevent the
girls from conceiving.28 7 The perpetrator of the act was the Indian
Health Services, an agency of the United States government.288 In
fact, it was the government that created the Indian Health Services
specifically to promote and implement the sterilization of all Native
American women. 289 Similarly, the individual doctor who performed
the surgeries, an act in furtherance of the crime of genocide, also com-
mitted an act of genocide. Because the removal of a girl's ovaries
would prevent her from reproducing, it is inevitable that if this mea-
sure or other sterilization procedures had been implemented against
all Native American women, as the Indian Health Services mandate
provided, the Native American population would have been de-
stroyed. A program that is mandated to sterilize all Native American
women is clearly designed to destroy, in whole or in part, the Native
American population; therefore, it amounted to genocide and violated
customary international law and the Genocide Convention.
The United States' practice of sterilizing criminals, mentally ill per-
sons, and imbeciles, which led to the implementation of similar prac-
tices against minorities, inspired the creation of sterilization laws in
Germany. 290 The idea of the implementation of sterilization programs
284. England, supra note 201.
285. Id.
286. Johansen, supra note 194.
287. The physical act of removing a woman's ovaries would inevitably lead to her inability to
reproduce; however, even if after the act she could reproduce, under the Genocide Convention
the perpetrator would still be accountable because steps were taken in furtherance of the crime
of genocide.
288. Johansen, supra note 194.
289. Strickland, supra note 8, at 328 (stating that "one tragic example of genocide in the medi-
cal profession was the involuntary sterilization of American Indian women").
290. Jeremiah A. Barondess, M.D., Medicine Against Society: Lessons from the Third Reich,
276 JAMA 1657, 1658 (1996). The first sterilization law in Germany was passed in 1933, provid-
ing for the sterilization of anyone "suffering from disease thought to be genetically determined,
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was clearly American made.29' However, in 1946, the United States
government established a Military Tribunal under General Orders No.
68292 to prosecute German doctors who carried out similar steriliza-
tion procedures, as well as other crimes against humanity and war
crimes. 293 Under the Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Ger-
many,294 the defendants were charged with war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
In the case that addressed the sterilizations in Nazi Germany, the
court charged eight Nazi physicians specifically with conducting ex-
perimental sterilization procedures that were calculated to develop a
method of sterilization that could be used to sterilize millions of peo-
ple within a minimum amount of time and effort.295 Subsequently, the
court convicted the Nazi doctors and sentenced some to life imprison-
ment and others to death by hanging.296
The sterilization program implemented by the Nazis is analogous to
the sterilization program implemented by the United States govern-
ment against Native Americans. In both situations, the act was sterili-
zation that was implemented with the intent to destroy one group's
ability to reproduce. However, unlike the Nazis, who have been held
accountable for their actions, the perpetrators of the sterilizations of
Native American women have not.
Various scholars have argued that the sterilization of Native Ameri-
can women was conducted on a voluntary basis. However, because of
the disproportionate application of sterilization procedures on Native
American women versus white women, it has become evident that the
including feeble-mindedness, schizophrenia, manic depressive disorder, epilepsy, Huntington
chorea, congenital blindness or deafness, malformation, and severe alcoholism." Id.
291. See PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION 106 (1991). The leaders in the steriliza-
tion movement in Germany confessed that their sterilization legislation was formulated after
studying the California experiment under Mr. Gosney and Dr. Popenoe's leadership. Id. The
study involved whether the current sterilization programs were cost effective, and found that
they were effective. Id. at 80.
292. THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 94-95 (t992).
293. Id.
294. Control Council Law No. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace, and Against Humanity), adopted at Berlin, Dec. 20 1945, Official Gazette of the
Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980).
295. Barondess, supra note 290, at 1664-65; Jay Katz, The Nuremberg Code and the Nurem-
berg Trial: A Reappraisal, 276 JAMA 1662, 1664-65 (1996); Ruth Faden, Ph.D., M.P.H., Susan E.
Lederer, Ph.D., Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D., US Medical Researchers, the Nuremberg Doctors
Trial, and the Nuremberg Code: A Review of Findings of the Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments, 276 JAMA 1667, 1667 (1996)
296. See supra note 292.
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sterilizations of Native American women were not performed volun-
tarily or with consent.297
C. The Physical Abuse and the Destruction of the "Cultural Unit"
The removal of all Indian children from their homes into boarding
schools was implemented by the Bureau of Indian Affairs with the
sole purpose to assimilate the "savage beast" to the white man's way
of life. The mandate of these schools was to "kill the Indian and save
the man. '298 This motto promoted physical abuse as a means to de-
stroy all things Indian. Burr, a Turtle Mountain Chippewa/Oglala
Sioux and student at the Wahpeton Boarding School, remembered be-
ing beaten by the women in charge of the dormitory for not making
her bed fast enough. 299 In fact, such beatings were common practice
in most boarding schools. 300
Another means implemented by the boarding schools, in hopes of
destroying all things Indian, was the prohibition of all practices com-
mon to the Indian tradition. For example, students were prohibited
from speaking their tribal language, wearing their tribal dress, practic-
ing their spiritual rituals, and wearing long hair.30 1 Instead, the chil-
dren were forced to speak English, practice Christianity, and conform
to the white man's way of life. 30 2
The forced removal of Native American children from their homes
with the intent to force Native Americans to forgo their cultural iden-
tity and assimilate to that of the white man's identity is in clear viola-
tion of Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention. 303 Article II(e)
prohibits "forcing the transfer of children of the group to another
group [with the intent to destroy the former, in whole or in part]. 30 4
The Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission found that
the Australian practice of moving indigenous persons from their
homes to other non-indigenous institutions violated Article II(e) of
297. Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 763, 809-810 (1993).
298. For a discussion on the common treatment of Native Americans in boarding schools, see
supra notes 221-248 and accompanying text. See also Brown, Love & Scott, supra note 229, at
410 (stating that "the purpose of Indian education ... was to 'de-Indianize' the children").
299. Kelley, supra note 224.
300. Id.
301. Peggy Doty, Constitutional Law: The Right to Wear a Traditional Indian Hair Style-
Recognition of a Heritage, NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 85, 86-87 (John R. Wunder ed., 1996).
302. Kelley, supra note 224.
303. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the Genocide Conven-
tion does not proscribe or protect against "cultural genocide").
304. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, at art. II. (e).
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the Genocide Convention. 30 5 The Commission found that the Austra-
lian government had committed acts of genocide against the indige-
nous population because the purpose of the removal was to destroy
the "cultural unit" by forcing the indigenous to assimilate to non-in-
digenous practices. 30 6 The Commission relied on evidence that de-
struction of the "cultural unit" would effectively cause the
disappearance of the indigenous peoples' culture and ethnicity.
307
The Australian government's practice of transferring the indigenous
to non-indigenous institutions with the intent to eradicate the indige-
nous culture is analogous to the United States government's forced
removal of Native American children from their homes.308 Both re-
sulted in the forced assimilation of different ethnic groups to the white
man's way of life. In fact, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Francis E. Leupp, condemned the United States' practice of
transferring Native Americans from their homes by stating, "[H]ow
was it preparing Indians for citizenship to carry off the children indis-
criminately [and] train them to despise practically all that their race
stands for?" 30 9 As the Australian government committed genocidal
acts against the indigenous, so too did the United States government,
its agencies, and its personnel commit genocidal acts against Native
Americans.
Interestingly, Kevin Gover, the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs
of the Department of the Interior, in his remarks at the Ceremony
Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, best summarized the genocidal acts perpe-
trated against Native Americans and their long-term effects on Native
Americans:
This agency forbade the speaking of Indian languages, prohibited
the conduct of traditional religious activities, outlawed traditional
government, and made Indian people ashamed of who they were.
Worst of all, the Bureau of Indian Affairs committed these acts
against the children entrusted to its boarding schools, brutalizing
them emotionally, psychologically, physically, and spiritually ...
The trauma of shame, fear and anger has passed from one genera-
tion to the next, and manifests itself in the rampant alcoholism, drug
abuse, and domestic violence that plague Indian country [today]....
305. Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Bringing them Home,
Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Chil-
dren From their Families, at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indigLRes/stolen (last visited
March 11, 2002). SCHABAS, supra note 95 at 178.
306. SCHABAS, supra note 95 at 178.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Gover, supra note 3.
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So many of the maladies suffered today in Indian country result
from the failures of this agency. Poverty, ignorance, and disease
have been the product of this agency's work.310
V. IMPACT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CENTURIES OF WRONGS: How
Do WE MAKE THE WRONGS RIGHT?
Although the genocidal acts perpetrated by the United States gov-
ernment were committed in the past, the Native Americans who ex-
perienced the genocide and their descendants have been forever
changed. Much of the population has patiently waited, wishing that
someone, someday would be held accountable for their loss, pain, and
grief; however, impunity has reigned, and Native Americans have
failed to receive the justice so much deserved for each person in the
world. Instead, they have been forced to coexist with the government,
agencies, and persons who committed the acts of genocide so vivid in
their collective memory.31' Regardless of when these crimes were
committed, these victims deserve to see their perpetrators held ac-
countable for their crimes, whether it is through a trial, an apology, or
the implementation of a reparation scheme.
By highlighting the fate of Native Americans today, the need for
accountability, which would enable Native Americans to relinquish
their badge of inferiority and begin the healing process, becomes
obvious.
A. The Effects of the American Genocide on Native
Americans Today
"Thirty-one percent of the total American Indian population, and
fifty-one percent of Indians residing on reservations, live below the
official government poverty level; while only thirteen percent of the
total United States population is in this predicament. '31 2 When the
taking of Native Americans' lands failed to turn them into civilized
farmers, the United States government turned toward forced assimila-
tion by implementing programs that disallowed Native Americans to
speak their language, practice their religion, and cohabitate with their
310. See RAWLINS, supra note 1.
311. Drumbl, supra note 74, at 1238.
312. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTrs. J. 57, 65 (1999). The socio-economic situation
facing Native Americans within the United States is, unfortunately, not uncommon to indige-
nous persons around the world. Id. The First Nations of Canada still, significantly, trail the
remaining population in income, while the indigenous peoples of Mexico, especially in the State
of Chiapas, face severe deprivation and degradation of values. Id. at 66-70, 87-89.
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families.313 After the assimilation programs failed to produce Native
Americans' complete assimilation to the white man's way of life, Na-
tive Americans who did not speak their native language and were
unknowledgeable of tribal ways were returned to their tribes with no
guidance as to their roles in the tribe. Children who experienced
forced assimilation are often described as "Apple Children," because
they are red on the outside, but white on the inside. 31 4 For example, a
forty-three-year-old Navajo woman, subjected to the United States
government boarding school program, on her first day back to her
tribe since her birth stated, "I don't know my own culture,... I am
going to need your help in understanding .... Teach me, teach my
children. ' 315 The transfer of Native Americans from their lands and
then from their families, traditions, and tribes destroyed in whole or in
part everything Native American and forced Native Americans to as-
similate to the white man's way of life and to be ashamed of their
ethnicity, leaving them with a badge of inferiority. 316 The effects of
the United States' policy of removing children from their homes has
been attributed as the cause of the high rate of poverty and suicide
among Native American children, which is at a rate four times that of
the general population. 317 Moreover, children transferred from their
homes to white families are more likely to suffer from "significant so-
cial problems" as adolescents and adults.3 1 8
The United States' policies toward Native American education,
which focused more on labor than education, resulted in a lack of for-
mal education for most Native Americans. 319 This lack of education,
and the corresponding feelings of inferiority, coupled with the dis-
criminatory treatment by the United States government led to the
problems of Native American children today. Nationally, the high
school dropout rate for Native Americans is estimated at forty-five to
fifty percent and as severe as eighty-five percent in the most depressed
areas of this country.320 Moreover, only approximately 7.7 percent of
313. For a historical perspective of the treatment of Native Americans by the United States
government, see supra notes 126-248 and accompanying text.
314. The Genocide of Native Americans: A Sociological View, supra note 167.
315. Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique of the Existing In-
dian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
316. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, in NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 151-52 (John R. Wunder ed.,
1996).
317. Graham, supra note 315, at 31-32. See also Barsh, supra note 248, at 222-23.
318. Barsh, supra note 248, at 222-223.
319. Brown, supra note 233, at 106.
320. Id. at 105.
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Native Americans over the age of twenty-five had completed four or
more years of college compared to 17.8 percent of whites.32'
B. The Need For Accountability
You cannot get peace without justice .... If there is not justice,
there is no hope of reconciliation or forgiveness because these peo-
ple do not know who to forgive .... I don't think that justice de-
pends on peace, but I think peace depends on justice.322
The United States can be characterized, in the case of the genocide
of the Native Americans, as a homogenous post-genocidal society. In
a homogenous post-genocidal society, the victim group is eliminated,
in whole or in part, and/or pushed to the depths of society so as to
barely exist to the public as a whole.323 Through the forced relocation
of Native Americans from the East onto Western reservations, the
United States government succeeded in secluding Native Americans
to certain remote areas. Despite the forced seclusion, Native Ameri-
cans have continued to live under the reign of the same government
that victimized them.324 Because there has not been a change of gov-
ernment in the United States, but rather a change in the power posi-
tion, an international criminal tribunal may be necessary to prosecute
the United States government, its agencies, and its personnel for their
actions in order to promote accountability. However, this would be
unnecessary if the United States government were willing to accept
criminal responsibility for its past actions and agreed to prosecute per-
sons who ordered, planned, and executed the genocide of the Native
Americans. 325 Yet to date, the United States government has been
unwilling either to accept criminal responsibility for the genocide or to
prosecute the persons who ordered, planned, or executed these
crimes.
The fact that the United States government is bound by both cus-
tomary international law, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition
and Prevention of Genocide (Genocide Convention), requires the
United States government to extradite or prosecute persons who com-
mit the crime of genocide. 326 Moreover, because the genocide of Na-
321. Id.
322. Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in 14 NOUVELLES
trUDES PPNALES 303, 305 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998).
323. Drumbl, supra note 74, at 1236.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. For a discussion of the formation of customary international law and the creation of the
Genocide Convention, as well as the obligations that flow from these laws, see supra notes 36-98
and accompanying text.
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tive Americans was committed by United States citizens and within
the boundaries of the United States, the narrow mandate of the
Proxmire Act cannot prohibit the prosecution of these perpetrators.
327
Therefore, if the United States government is unwilling to prosecute
the perpetrators of these crimes, the international community must
step in to ensure the victims' right to access justice.
The United Nations has established that a victim's right to a remedy
includes not only access to justice, but also reparations for harm suf-
fered and access to factual information concerning the violations.328
Champions for accountability and those fighting against the history of
impunity declare that the "right to compensation and reparation ac-
knowledges the truth and admits justice. Truth is fundamental to our
knowledge of history .... And justice is fundamental to our collective
aspirations .... "329 Even though we may now have the truth, we do
not have the justice or the reparations; however, the question remains:
Are reparations in and of themselves sufficient to heal the loss, pain,
and suffering of Native Americans?
C. Reparations for the Crime of Genocide
Compensation can never compensate. 330
In 1988, President Reagan signed a federal bill that formally apolo-
gized to Japanese-Americans who were interned in the United States
during World War II and authorized a reparation scheme, which
granted each internee $20,000.331 Following this apology and the
327. See supra notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
328. The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M.
Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/33, U.N. Doe. E/
CN.4162 (18 Jan. 2000). See The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Vic-
tims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Note by the Secretariat,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/61 (29 Dec. 2000) (stating, "At its fifty-sixth session, the Commission on
Human Rights adopted resolution 2000/41, entitled The Rights to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilition for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms").
Madeline H. Morris, International Guidelines Against Impunity: Facilitating Accountability, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 29, 30 (1996) (stating that holding perpetrators accountable includes:
prosecution, and reparation for the victim).
329. Iris Almeida, Compensation and Reparation for Gross Violations of Human Rights: Ad-
vocating the International Discourse and Action, in 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALES 398, 403
(1998).
330. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91 (1998) (quoting Joseph W. Singer).
331. Mark Gladstone & Jerry Gillam, La Follette Assails U.S. Payments to Wartime Internees,
L.A. TIMES (Valley Edition), Aug. 11, 1988, at 8. Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, more
than 120,000 Japanese-Americans were relocated into internment camps. Cathleen Decker,
Politics 88: Bush Calls Payment of Reparations for Japanese-American Internees "Only Fair,"
L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1988, at 12.
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granting of reparations, a Japanese-American woman who was forced
into an internment camp stated that "she always felt the internment
was wrong, but that, after being told by the military, the President and
the Supreme Court that it was a necessity, she had come seriously to
doubt herself. Redress and reparations and the recent successful
court challenges, had now freed her soul. '332 While various Japanese-
Americans celebrated and rejoiced in the conquest of their painful
memories of the past and their feelings of inferiority, many members
of other minority groups felt ambivalent about the Japanese-Ameri-
can reparations. 333 One African American scholar stated, "After
some introspection, I guiltily discovered that my sentiments were re-
lated to a very dark, brooding feeling that I had fought long and hard
to conquer-inferiority. A feeling that took first root in the soil of
'Why them and not me." 334 Native Americans, like various other mi-
nority groups that were victimized by the United States government,
its agencies, and its personnel and have not as of yet received repara-
tions or an apology, experienced somewhat the same ambivalence and
were left asking the same question: "Why them and not me?"
Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs has recently apologized for
its history of ethnic cleansing,335 the United States government has
never implemented a sufficient reparation scheme to redress the
crimes committed against Native Americans. 336 This apology from
a member of the government represents the first step in the healing
process for those Native Americans victimized by the United States
government, its agencies, and its personnel. Yet today, Native Ameri-
cans remain left asking, "Why them and not me?" 337
332. Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African Ameri-
can Claims, 19 B.C. THIR1 WORLD L.J. 477, 478 (1998). Danieli, supra note 322, at 209 (stating
that most Japanese-Americans finally felt vindication because they had harboured the belief that
they were viewed by the United States government as enemies and second-class citizens).
333. Yamamoto, supra note 332, at 477-78.
334. Id. at 478.
335. Remarks of Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs Department of the Interior
at the Ceremony Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, supra note 3.
336. Past reparation schemes granted to Native Americans were usually applied to only one
tribe in order to redress the appropriation of the tribe's land and resources. Examples include:
$81 million to the Klamaths of Oregon; $105 million to the Sioux of South Dakota; $12.3 million
to the Seminoles of Florida; $31 million to the Chippewas of Wisconsin; and $32 million to the
Ottowas of Michigan. However, none of these reparation schemes redress the sterilization of
Native American women or the forced relocation of children into boarding schools. Yamamoto,
supra note 332, at 484 n22.
337. It is argued that Japanese Americans, as a collective entity, not as individuals, succeeded
on their reparation claims because:
(1) their challenge addressed a specific executive order and ensuing military orders; (2)
the challenge was based on then-existing constitutional norms (due process and equal
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D. Under What Circumstances Are Reparations
Granted in the United States?
In the opinion of the United States government, the internment of
Japanese-Americans warranted reparations because of the underlying
reasons for the internment, the indiscriminate nature of the intern-
ment, and the conditions of the internment.338 In 1988, Vice President
George Bush stated that reparations were "an appropriate way to re-
dress violations of civil rights of loyal, hard-working Japanese-Ameri-
cans. '339 Similarly, in 1991, the United States attorney, defending
Congress' decision to enact legislation to redress the treatment of Jap-
anese-Americans, stated that such redress was necessary because "the
policy under which they were interned was driven by racial prejudice,
wartime hysteria and a lack of political leadership. ' 340 However, even
though Congress approved a reparation scheme for the Japanese-
Americans, they refused similar redress for ethnic Germans and
Italians who were interned during World War II because they were
not subjected to the indiscriminate mass roundups imposed on the
Japanese. 341
The forced relocation of Native American children to boarding
school is analogous to the indiscriminate mass roundups imposed on
Japanese-Americans during World War II. Moreover, because the
philosophies of "Manifest Destiny," the Indian Removal Act, and the
Indian Health Services sterilization programs were all directed at Na-
tive American persons based solely on their ethnicity, it is obvious
that such policies were rooted in racial prejudice. When we apply the
United States' justifications for the Japanese-Americans' reparations,
there seems to be no reason that Native Americans have not received
their reparations. However, in cases of mass victimization, as in the
case of Native Americans, we cannot rely on these ad hoc reparation
protection); (3) both a congressional commission and the courts identified specific facts
amounting to violations of those norms; (4) the claimants were easily identifiable as
individuals (those who had been interned and were still living); (5) the government
agents were identifiable (specific military and Justice and War Department Officials):
(6) these agents' wrongful acts resulted directly in the imprisonment of innocent peo-
ple, causing them injury; (7) the damages, although uncertain, covered a fixed time and
were limited to survivors; and (8) payment meant finality.
Id. at 490.
338. Id.
339. Decker, supra note 331, at 12.
340. Sonni Efron, German-American Challenges Reparations For War Internees; Courts: Man
Claims Law Giving Japanese-Americans Compensation Discriminates on Basis of National Ori-
gin, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1991, at A3.9.
341. Id.
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schemes relied on by the United States government in the past. 342 In-
stead, we need to create a set of permanent guidelines for victim
reparations.
E. Guidelines for Victim Reparations
The United Nations Guidelines for Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Grave Violations of Human Right in-
cludes the three aforementioned remedies for victimization: (1) access
to justice, (2) reparation, and (3) access to facts regarding what oc-
curred, which is in essence the truth.3 43 Reparation, which can be de-
fined as "the process of making amends for harm and injustice
suffered," 344 includes not only the restoration of the victim to the orig-
inal situation before the violations occurred, the compensation for any
economically assessable damage resulting from the violations, and re-
habilitation, but also satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. 345
In addition to these guidelines, it is recommended that the compensa-
tion not be granted in one lump sum, but rather monthly install-
ments. 346 By receiving continual compensation, the victim will feel
vindication over and over again until the pain weakens and at some
point, hopefully, it disappears.347
Furthermore, the perpetrator should be required to reveal the truth
of his crimes to the public at large, so the victim and his family can
experience public vindication for their past victimization. Only at the
moment that the truth is revealed will the pain disappear, the badge of
inferiority vanish, and the victim realize that it was not his fault. As
President Ronald Reagan so eloquently expressed while signing the
bill that expressed the nation's apology, as well as compensation for
the internment of the Japanese-Americans, "No payment can make
342. The United States government has agreed to apologize or repatriate victims in the fol-
lowing instances: President Clinton apologized to indigenous Hawaiians for the illegal United
States aided overthrow of the sovereign nation and the near decimation of Hawaiian life; the
federal government offered reparation to the African American victims of the Tuskegee syphilis
experiment; the government apologized and provided reparations for Japanese Latin Americans
kidnapped from Latin American countries and placed in internment camps in the United States.
343. The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note
328.
344. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report
2000, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Feb. 2001).
345. Id.
346. Danieli, supra note 322, at 309.
347. Id.
[Vol. 51:911
2002] NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATION 961
up for those lost years. What is most important in this bill has less to
do with property than with honor. For here we admit wrong. ' 348
The Native Americans victimized at the hands of the United States
government, its agencies, and its personnel have heard the truth from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, yet not from the President of the United
States; therefore, in essence, they are left waiting for both the public
truth and the personal justice, which can be received through holding
the perpetrators criminally responsible for their past genocidal acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
We are not alone. The world is changing, and we are a part of the
transformation. Despite all the injustice in the world, and despite
the things that happen to us that we feel we don't deserve, and de-
spite the fact that we sometimes feel incapable of changing what is
wrong with the world ... love will help us grow. Only then will we
be able to understand the stars and miracles. 349
For my great aunt and thousands of other Native Americans who
were victimized because of their "savage" nature and the United
States' opportunistic dreams of westward expansion, love has helped
them cope with their victimization, but the injustices that they exper-
ienced and continue to experience are not forgotten. Day to day,
their voices go unheard and the pain deepens, while the next genera-
tion is raised with the victim's tainted view of truth, justice, stars, and
miracles.
The time has come to break this cycle of injustice. As parties to the
Convention on the Prevention and Prohibition of the Crimes of Geno-
cide and according to customary international law, the United States
is bound by international law to prosecute or extradite the perpetra-
tors of these crimes. Once this task is accomplished, a public apology
and reparations must be made to every victim of the genocide in order
to facilitate the healing process. Thereby, the truth and justice will
effectively restore the victim's ability "to understand the stars and
miracles" of life on earth.
Lindsay Glauner350
348. MINOW, supra note 330, at 112-113.
349. PABLO COELHO, THE VALKYRIES (Alan R. Clarke trans., 1992).
350. As a Native American and being of twenty-five percent Native American blood, the
stories of my ancestors inspired me to research the atrocities committed by the United States
Government, its agencies, and its personnel against western Native Americans.
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